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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE NATION 
Along the waterfront of continental United States to the 
Panama Canal, the American Merchant Marine has been classified as a 
"'sick" industry. It is considered uneconomic because of its dependence 
upon government subsidies to offset the cost disadvantages experienced 
in competition with foreign-flag operators. One salient determinant of 
this cost disadvantage is the level of wages paid to American seamen, a. 
level which critics usually claim is the result of unrealistic actions 
on the part of seamen's unions. In this area, the divergent interests 
of labor and management have motivated the publication of conflicting 
opinions, a condition which is not unusual in the dynamic labor market 
of our econom;r. The preparation of this paper has been influenced by 
the author's 17 years of eJq:erienced as an arbiter of disputes American 
seamen and masters of vessels of the United States. 
STATll!ENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the maritime labor 
costs in connection with their effecta on the industry by three methods 
of approach: first, to explore the extent of the costs supported by the 
subsidization policy of the United States Government; second, to evaluate 
the justifications offered by seamen's unions in support of the wage 
levels attained by their effortsr and third, to appraise the claims of 
management;, in relation to the other two. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MARITIME INDUSTRY TO THE NATION 
As part of our national. defense, The history of the United 
States as well as other maritime nations is replete with irrefutable 
proofs that a fleet of merchant ships is necessary to furnish the vital. 
supply lines, for ~ and air force bases overseas and to support the 
navy in its task of defending these supply lines. A review of our 
history provides substantial evidence for unquail.ified support of an 
aclecquate merchant marine to complement our navy in maintaining the 
security necessary for our foreign co11111erce: the role of merchant 
vessels in the war for independence; their value again in the turmoil 
of 18121 directing their efforts to maintain our independence; their 
subsequent decline, and the feverish shipbuilding to satisfy the needs 
of World War I; a repetition of decline and hasty rebuilding to sue~ 
cessfully participate in World War II; and finally, their heavy use 
during the Korean police action of the United Nations. We have learned 
costly lessons from past wars, No longer is sheer manpower the criterion 
for victory. More important is vital war materiel, but it must be on 
hand at the precise moment when needed. For this crucial timing, no sub-
stitute has been devised for a fleet of transoceanic freighters and 
tankers despite the recognized advances in aviation, We must aJ.so face 
the problem of preparedness,;; since the advent of the Atomic Age, we can 
no longer expect to have such breathing spells for rebuilding in time 
to achieve victory. 
The past is well defended, Now, what is the attitude of our 
national leaders concerning the present and the future of the American 
2 
Merchant Marine? Navy Secretary Thomas S. Gates, Jr., stated the 
position of the Pentagon before the House Marine Committee on July 19, 
1957, 11.! large, modern and well balanced American Merchant Marine is 
positiTely vital to our national defense planning. , • Without it, 
neither the military effort nor the war econom;r could be supported,"* 
Senator William F. Know land, Republican from California, 
supported the Secretary of the Navy in his speech, representing the 
legislative opinion, to leaders of the industry at Rockefeller Plawit in 
New York City on~ 25, 1957, "The American Merchant Marine is the 
fourth arm of this nation's defense, and in this day and age of contin-
ing international crisis, it becomes more important than ever before in 
our maritime history that we permit no weaknesses in the defense of our 
country to occur."** 
As part of our econo&• Table I refiects one phase of the 
importance of the American Merchant Marine to our econom;r during 1950, 
It reveals that subsidized operators paid $120,964,000 for direct 
employment and $225,661,000 for indirect employment, a total of 
$346,625,000 for this year. This expenditure, ~ich is fostered by the 
government, serves to stimulate other industries as well as the maritime 
industry. As one example, it has been estimated that the annual 
cost of meals served to both passenger ships and freighters totaled 
approximately $55,ooo,ooo. Nor is the subsidy a non-revenue outl~ on 
the part of the government, for from Table I it has been estimated 
* 33, P• 2 
H67, P• 58M 
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TABLE I 
DISBURSEMENT AND E2fi'LOIMENT 
IN SUBSIDIZED LINES OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE 
DURING 1950 
Direct Employment: 
Domestic saleries and wages paid to: 
1. Administrative type personnel 
2. Seagoing 
3. Longshoremen 
Sub-total 
Indirect Employment: 
Domestic vessel expenditures, other 
than salaries and wages (as above) 
Other domestic and miscellaneous 
expenditures 
Capital expenditures 
Sub-total 
TOTAL 
Source: 
Amount of 
Disbursements 
$ 20,475,000 
88,507,000 
ll,982,000 
Jl20,964,060 
$179,263,000 
29,889,000 
16,509,000 
$225,661,000 
.. $346,62$,000 
Number 
Employed 
Direct and 
Indirect 
7,100 
33,400 
6,400 
46,906 
38,600 
6,400 
3,600 
48,600 
95,500 
4 
that taxes on direct wages yield about $24,193,000 and on indirect 
wages approximately $41,830,400, a total return to the government of 
$66,023,400 for 1950.* 
The above figures comprise the pli3'JIIent of wages to 95,500 
persons utilized in direct and indirect employment by subsidized 
companies of the American Merchant Marine during 1950. In the annual 
report of the Maritime Administration for 1950, the American Merchant 
Marine was shown to consist of 10 subsidized companies and 10 non-
subsidized companies. Only those companies operating vessels on 31 
trade routes designated as essential by the Maritime Administration 
are eligible for operating subsidies. Hence the above wages, taxes, 
and payments to other industries may be doubled as an estimate of the 
total economic value of the maritime industry to our economy for this 
year. 
In addition to the economic worth of seamen's wages, a proper 
evaluation of the effect of the maritime industry on the national 
economy should include the same consideration of wages and subse~ent 
tax returns of the employees in the related shipbuilding and repairing 
industry. It lli.ll be noted in Table II that such employment reached a 
war-induced high of 354,100 employees in 1946, and that currently • 
decline is in effect from 267,200 employees in 1952 to 2D6,500 in 1955. 
Despite the decline, these totals add substantially to the approximate 
I 96,000 annual total of persons employed in 1950 shOll!l in Table I, 
affording wages and tax returns from approximately 300,000 persons. 
* 16, P• 2.7·28 
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Year 
-
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
TABLE II 
MONTHLY AVERAGE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE 
SHIPBUILDING AND REPAIRING INDUSTRY OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1946-55 
(In Thousands) 
Total Private Yards 
354ol 210.0 
224.0 137.3 
213.9 124.2 
171.8 88.1 
145.7 72.0 
223.2 102.2 
267.6 134.2 
255.o 131.2 
218.3 108.4 
206.5 99.5 
New Yards 
144.1 
86.6 
89.7 
83.7 
73.6 
121.2 
133.4 
123.8 
109.8 
107.0 
Note: The industry includes establishments primarily engaged in 
building and repairing all types of ships, barges, canal 
boats and lighters of 5 gross tons and over. 
Source: 
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This approach may be more readily evaluated for its economic importance 
by comparing the above group with other groups of unionized workers in 
the United States. The total of workers associated with the maritime 
industry compares favorable with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
Union which, by virtue of its 385,000 membership, ranks tenth in size 
among the labor unions of the United States. 
The importance of the problem has been discussed on the 
premise that a part shares the value of the whole. Since the maritime 
industry is sick, its labor costs have a direct bearing upon its condi-
tions of health. These costs influence the capacity of the industry 
and its subsequent valueto our national defense and econo~. 
As the factors pertaining to the cost of labor are explored 
and developed in succeeding chapters, it should be held in mind that 
another critical movement affects the industry. It is experiencing a 
decline in relative size to the world tonnage. The active merchant 
fleet in 1957 was a smaller portion of the world's tonnage than it was 
in 1939,;; Table III shows a steady decline since 1952. This drop reflects 
the end of the stimuli provided by the Korean police action of the United 
Nations and the slowdown of the European recovery program. An indication 
of the effect of such world crisis may be obtained by the demand for 
shipping space in 1951 over that in 1950t A total of 82 million long 
tons of cargo was shipped overseas in 19511 an increase of 47 million 
tons over 1950. Despite increased exports ranging from 100 to 300 per 
cent to Great Britain and areas of Europe • demand continued to exceed 
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Year 
-
1939 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
TABLE III 
MERCHANT MARINE OF THE WORLD AND ACTIVE MERCHANT 
FLEET OF THE UNITED STATES, 1939, 1949-57 
(In Thousands of Deadweight Tons) 
World (minus 
u. s. Reserve 
Fleet) 
57,500 
83,900 
83,446 
92,330 
95,ll3 
98,732 
102,496 
107,516 
ll3,558 
124,076 
u. s. 
Active Fleet 
1,365 
18,126 
14,673 
17,419 
18,520 
17,859 
16,487 
15,331 
13,694 
14,371 
u. s. Active Fleet 
As Per Cent of 
World Fleet 
12.8 
21.6 
17.6 
18.9 
19.5 
18.1 
16.1 
14.3 
12.1 
u.6 
Note: Includes seagoing ships of 1,000 gross tons and over; 
excludes ships on the inland waterways, the Great Lakes, 
those owned by any military force, and special types, 
such as cable ships, tugs, etc. 
Source: u. S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration: 
Merchant Fleets of the WOrld, September l, 1939 -
December 31, 1951. Washington, G. P. o., November, 
1952. P• 48, Appendix Table 3a. Annual Report of the 
Federal Maritime Board and Maritime Administration, 
appropriate years. 
8 
production that year.* Susceptibility to world crises is apparent 
again; this thesis deals with labor costs in the wake of the turning 
point. 
* 86, P• 4 
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CHAPTER II 
A SURVEY OF THE SEAMAN 
To young and unitiated persons the seaman is a romantic indi-
vidual similar to the American cowboy whose job is visualized as stimu-
lating adventure distinctly apart from the hum-drum life confined to one 
spot on land. What could be more desirable than to call at distant and 
exciting ports of the world, have intimate contact with the nations and 
their people who share current newspaper headlines, and be paid for it? 
HIS ENVIRONMENT 
Beyond a doubt the American seaman has the best job among 
seafaring people. Since Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., wrote into 
the 1915 Seaman's Act his rights and privileges and their subse~uent 
expansion by progressive management and seamen's unions, his status 
changed from that of quasi-slavery to enjoyment of the highest standards 
of living among maritime workers.* 
The fore-castle is designed with as much thought as the 
master's quarters to give him a clean, modern room complete with 
prescribed ventilation, lockers, bedding, toilet articles, and regularly 
changed linen. American-flag vessels also provide adequate lavatories, 
washrooms, and showers equipp;ld with hot and cold fresh water.** 
He has the finest of balanced diets offered in restaurant 
* 29, P• 16 
**51 • P• 57-58 
style; at each meal a menu lists choices of the main dish, vegetables, 
and beverages. Perishable items include fresh milk, fruit, and 
vegetables in sufficient quantities to last from port to port under 
normal care as well as adequate supplies of fruit juices and shore 
bread. All watches have coffee tiae and rest periods;; extended over-
time work warrants hot midnight lunches.* 
Working hours are humane by all current standards. Eight 
hours in a spread of 9 constitute the working day for the deck and 
engine departments, while the stewards' department has a work da;y- of 8 
hours in a spread of 13. The work week runs from Monday to Friday~ 
routine work performed on Saturday, Sunday, and holidays commands over-
time compensation. Work other than routine brings in an overtime pay in 
addition to the overtime that the seaman receives for standing his 
regular sea watch.** 
He enjoys the same 9 holida;y-s as his fellow citizen ashore, as 
follows: New Year's Day, Lincoln's Birthday, Washington's Birthda;y-1 
Memorial DaY, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veteran's Day, Thanksgiving 
Day, and Christmas. In the event that V .E. or V .J. days are decla:red 
national holidays, the list shall include them. When a holiday falls on 
Sat urday or Sunday, in port or at sea, the following Monday becomes a 
designated holiday.*** 
Other working conditions exhibit the same rate of progress 
consistent with our high American standard of living. Safety while on 
11 
and off duty is a condition of employment; navigation laws and WIOrking 
agreements both regulate fire and lifeboat drills. The United States 
Public Health Service provides free medical attention. Management 
assumes the responsibility for furnishing sate gear and working 
equipment.* 
The basic pay and fringe benefits of the American seaman are 
the highest of all maritime nations. Chapter IV of this thesis deals 
with all particulars of seamen 1 s wages. 
It is not the intent of this thesis to deny equality of all 
the above factors with the seamen of other maritime nations. With the 
exception of remuneration, there are many equalities. Certainly, the 
modern ships of some foreign merchant marine services provide equally 
clean rooms and well•balanced meals. In fact, a different foreign 
merchant marine may exceed the others in each of several fringe benefits. 
For example, the Danish-flag J. Lauritsen Line employs a dentist for 
full-time travel from ship to ship where he repairs every tooth on board 
at no cost to the crew. But an analysis of all benefits with proper 
weight applied to the salient factor of wages will place the American 
seaman at the top of the group. 
THE NATURE OF HIS :EMPLOYMENT 
The seaman's job is at best fluctuating in tenure, frustrating 
in family relationship, and confining in co-worker association. 
Statistics place his earning power at an annual consistency of 
*51, P• 28 
12. 
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less than 7 months, while the industry itself provides less than 75,000 
jobs.* At June 30, 1957, the number of employed seamen on United States 
privately owned and operated ships of over 1,000 gross tons was 60,700•** 
Voyage terminations present another disadvantage peculiar to the 
maritime industry. Each voyage must terminate because that is the 
mission of all personnel; however, each brings about the need to sign 
another set.of shipping articles for employment during the next voyage, 
and each new agreement entails satisfYing the physical requirements. 
The seaman must pass a medical examination before each voyage, and 
management has the right to reject him if the medical examiner decides 
he is unfit for employment.*** Few are the jobs in other industries 
that place their employees in such annual jeopardy. Then too, as he 
grows older, he becomes less capable of passing the numerous medical 
examinations. Normal physical deterioration and age act together to 
bring the seaman's earning power to an end. 
In wartime the seaman is proud of his semi-militar,y occupation. 
He is aware that arwies and navies are successful only to the extent of 
the efficiency of their supply lines and that the American Merchant 
Marine serves in this capacity as the fourth ranking member of the armed 
forces during periods of war. But it is a tiresome and undesirable job 
that demands semi~itary discipline during normal civilian operations 
in peacetime. It's one thing to be under orders of the boss during 
working hours and another to be answerable on free time. But that is 
* 19, P• 120-21 
** 85, P• 20 
*** 57, P• 'J!f 
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the lot of the seaman. The ship must not be delayed. He may be off 
watch in port, but he cannot go ashore for a movie, a drink, or other 
pleasure unless there is ample time before cargo or bunker operations 
are completed because the ship must sail without unnecessar,r delay. 
Certainly there are few jobs in other industries that are so demanding 
of an employee's free time. 
Curtailed free time ashore frustrates officers and crew alike 
on lll&lY runs, particularly the effects of fast turnarounds in home ports 
on married seamen who wish to have a place in the lives of their young, 
growing children. After a long voyage of several months, the seaman 
feels that he is entitled to a layover of several weeks to become part 
of the family again. If he has worked 180 days in a spread of 360 
consecutive days under the same union agreement, he is entitled to a 
vacation of 7 days. Working ~70 consecutive days gives him a l~day 
vacation. He earns 14 days for working 360 consecutive days, while 
contiiiilous duty of 360 days with one employer provides an additional 14 
days.* Vacation-wise the maKin'm benefit of ~8 days a year for seamen 
who stay with one ship or one compacy compares favorable with shoreside 
jobs. But even the maximum benefits - and certainly the lesser ones -
entail re-introduction to the young children after such lengthy absences. 
In the case of regular runs, residence near the home port or 
regular port of call may mitigate the extended absences from the family. 
But these visits are limited in time to the hours necessar,r for turna-
round because all forces of our competitive econo~ work to sail the 
*57, P• 3 
ship. Tied to a pier, a vessel is uneconomic. Tankers are notorious 
for short periods of time in port because pumps load or unload their 
liquid cargo in hours rather than days. Bulk ore carriers waste barely 
more time at their berths. Seamen of the Ore Steamship Company, a. 
subsidiary of Bethlehem Steel Corporation, practically live at sea on 
the regular run between Sparrows Point, Maryland, and Cruz Grande, Chile. 
No shore leave is permitted in Cruz Grande because the 8,564-ton vessels 
are loaded under conveyor-fed bins in about 3 hours. Discharge of the 
bulk ore at Sparrows Point takes longer, from 3 to 4 days. These 
ships travel like clock-work because efficient management planning calls 
for the arrival of the bulk ore at the piers and the mills at prescribed 
inPervals. 
"It's like a steel prison," aptlY put a mate on the SS CHILORE, 
describing his job to the Panama Canal Boarding Party. 
Dry cargo vessels on regular foreign or intercoastal voyages, 
require less confinement on board because this cargo takes longer for 
loading and unloading at all ports of call. But family life suffers. 
Seamen of the Santa ships of the Grace Line's regular 5-week run between 
New York and the West Coast of South America enjoy 2: or 3 dey-s at home 
if they live near New York City. Part of this time is consumed in the 
pay-off and signing the shipping articles for the next voyage after the 
vessel is secure. 
FamilY separation does not app!y to all seamen. Youngsters,, 
eager to see the world, go to sea before they marry and become aware of 
their unfavorable circumstances after a few years when the travel lure 
has dissolved. Confirmed bachelors see no hardship. 
15 
A salient characteristic of the seafarer's job is the close 
association with fellow workers. They must work, eat, and live together. 
DaY after day while at sea on long trips they see no other faces. The 
conduct of each seaman intimately and directly affects the others. They 
must work closely as a team to bring the ship safely to its destination 
·~thout costly delays. If one seaman neglects or refuses to perform his 
part of the assignment at sea, inevitably the others must take over the 
disregarded task to maintain efficient operation. This relationship 
constitutes, at the least, a strain on nerves. 
THE HIRING HALL 
The function of the hiring hall is to respond to the requests 
of ship operators for manning vessels. The seaman looks upon the hiring 
hall as the cornerstone of his working agreements and relies upon its 
operation to counteract the ine~ties of the characteristically casual 
employment of the maritime industry. He depends upon it to make fair 
and equitable distribution of work, stabilizing the industry in this 
respect. The seaman regards the operation of the hiring hall as a normal 
and proper function of his union which, for industries like construction 
and maritime, must be the exclusive source of manpower in order to 
distribute jobs on a share the work basis.* 
When a seaman wishes to ship out, he registers with the hiring 
hall b.y exhibiting his Merchant Mariner's Document which is issued by 
the United States Coast Guard and bears his authorized rating. As the 
* l, P• 83 
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hiring hall supplies men for ships, he moves to the head ot· the list in 
the order of his registration. This procedure is not necessary for 
those who sign off a vessel and wish to rejoin within a few days upon 
its immediate voyage because any seaman may elect to sail permanently on 
a vessel of his liking. But for those who want extended time ashore 
between trips, the hiring hall precludes the necessity of a constant 
vigil at the waterfront to snare a vacancy or the former practice of a 
kickback to a ship's officer or agent for a berth. 
Seamen are no strangers to retaliatory blows of management to 
any part of their domain, but the Taft-Hartley Act shook them like fore-
sails. In its legislative language aimed to outlaw the closed shop and 
discrimination in hiring, it spelled out doom for the hiring hall. A 
seaman eloquently pointed out the difference between the hiring hall and 
a closed shop in a Senate hearing: 
A. factory can conceivably be operated without the closed 
shop, without a hiring hall, but a ship is not a factory. A 
ship is not a shop. A factory does not make an occasional 
trip to Shanghai and back to New York. • • The men work in 
the factory for a longer period of time. When one quits his 
job the others remain. On a ship, most of the w~n quit at 
the same time;. that is, at the end of the voyage. They have 
to quit if they are to remain anywhere normal mentally. When 
the ship pays off, the men all pile off, and a new crew is 
hired. If the maritime unions are to survive, they must con-
trol the hiring. When the ship docks and pays off, it must 
be manned by union men, otherwise the union disappears from 
that ship.* 
Since October 11, 1947, the unions have continued to operate 
and control the hiring hall under an informal compromise between the 
* 90, P• 14 
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then president of the Seafarers International Union, Harry Lundeberg, 
and Senator Robert A. Taft, co-author of the law.* 
The National Maritime Union also controls its hiring halls 
under a similar agreement which entails the elimination of union member• 
ship requirement in the employment section of its working agreement, as 
follows: "There shall be no discimination because of race, creed, color, 
national origin, or membership or non-membership in the Union."** 
The unions are not happy with this arrangement. They believe 
that the hiring halls, which are supported by union dues, should not be 
compelled to extend benefits to free riders. Since 1947 they have 
lobbied for legislation that will authorize the existence of the hiring 
hall as a recognized union prerogative, operated exclusively for union 
members•* So far, they have been unsuccessful. 
* 30, p. 3 
**51, P• 2:6 
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CHAPTER III 
THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNI'lENT 
Many countries adher to the doctrine that a merchant marine is 
vital to a nation's economy and accordingly warrants support in the form 
of monopolies and subsidies. These countries include France, Finland, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the U.S.S.R.* The British look upon foreign 
trade and shipping as a service and impetus to their other industries, a 
point of view which justifies their broad definition of the subsidy to 
their maritime industry in the form of aid, assistance, money, property, 
or subvention. The British reject the point of view that shipping is 
just another industry of the country and, as such, should receive only 
its share of public support. They believe that the maritime industry 
serves to benefit the entire British Empire and that its activity 
stimulates all British industries.** 
The United States has concurred to some extent with this 
international policy over a period of years, stemming from a law passed 
in 1789 to allow a 10 per cent tariff discount on all goods imported on 
American-built and American-owned ships; later, the Ocean Mail Act of 
1891 set forth subsidy p~ents to vessels transporting the mails. The 
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 again demonstrated national policy, applied 
to the problem of the large government-owned fleet of merchant ships on 
hand after World War I. This act put the government in the steamship 
* 5, p. 112-13 
** 9, P• 6-7 
business, operating its merchant vessels on trade routes "desirable for 
the promotion, development, expansion, and maintenance of the foreign 
and coastwise trade of the United States and an adequate mail service." 
As trade developed along these essential routes, the government offered 
the ships plus the business to private enterprise. The scarcity of 
response indicated that additional government support was necessary. 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1928 corrected many obvious disadvantages 
contained in the Act of 1920, but retained control of operations in the 
hands of the Post Office Department which determined the routes for 
ocean-mail subsidies. It was soon apparent that a subsidy formed for the 
purpose of mail transportation with operation confined to one American 
port for each of the 209 berth services was too inflexible for the 
promotion of foreign trade. Fi~Ally, the Post Office Department admitted 
to Congress that it could not correlate ocean-mail contracts with the 
needs of commerce•* 
War experiences have also contributed heavily to the formula-
tion of the policy of our government concernir~ the merchant marine. At 
the start of World War I, our total merchant tonnage could carry only 9 
per cent of our foreign trade. By 1918, the foreign ships which serviced 
our trade had been impressed into their countries' war needs. Our ports 
were jaa~ed with unshipped cargo, and despite the creation of the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation in 1916 designed to accelerate shipbuilding, 
we were forced to rely upon allied shipping during the war. Again, prior 
to World War II, our merchant marine was entirely insufficient to satisfy 
* 7, P• 84 
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both military requirements and our productive ability as the arsenal of 
the world; this inadequacy induced passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 
THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 1936 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, spells out the 
policy of the United States Government concerning the maritime industr,y 
in the following language which has become the Magna Charter of the 
American ~erchant Marine: 
It is necessar,y for the national defense and development 
of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States 
shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carr,y its 
domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of the 
waterborne export and import commerce of the United States, and 
to provide shipping service on all routes essential for 
maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign waterborne 
commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and 
militar,y auxiliar,r in time of war or national emergency, (c) 
owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens of 
the United States insofar as mq be practicable, and (d) 
composed of the best-e~uipped, safest, and most suitable types 
of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a 
trained and efficient citizen personnel. It is hereby declared 
to be the policy of the United States to foster- the development 
and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant amrine. 
The Act eliminated the ocean-mail subsidy and replaced the Post 
Ol'fice Department by the United States Maritime Commission as the agency 
to designate the trade routes. On May 24, 1950, Reorganization Plan No. 
21 eliminated the United States Maritime Commission and created the 
Federal Maritime Board and the Maritime Administration as the agencies 
to carr,y out the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. 
* 3, P• 6-8 
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The Federal Maritime Board is charged with the performance of 
the regulatory functions contained in titles V, VI, and VIII, and 
sections 301, 708, 805(a), and 805(f) of the act which deal with making, 
amending, and terminating subsidy contracts as well as their attendant 
hearings. The Board has other duties which it performs under the 
direction of the Secretary of Commerce, but its decisions pertaining to 
the above subsidy functions are independent of the Secretary of Commerce 
and final. The Maritime Administration assumed the responsibility for 
the execution and administration of the various programs of the Act such 
as shipping, port development, shipbuilding, bareboat charter, sale and 
transfer of ships, nuclear ship program, ship mortgage and loan insurance, 
and aid to vessels over 20 years of age. Both agencies strive to carry 
out the intent of the Merchant Marine Act for the development and 
promotion of an American Merchant Marine suf.ficient to carry the 
domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of the foreign 
commerce of the country, fostering the basic principles of "providing 
.for ma.x:l.mum priva.te ownership and operation of the merchant n:.arine with 
.full initiative in its own development of the shipping business and the 
solution of maritime problems, limiting Federal participation to the 
extent required to meet the country's economic and national security 
needs, and administering the ccuntry1s maritime laws in an economical, 
efficient, and effective manner."* 
Compared to other industries in the United States, the 
maritime industry is relatively small, but it is not surprising that our 
* 85, P• l-9 
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government provides so much assistance in the light of analyzing its 
importance to our foreign trade and military position among world 
powers -particularly since it would repeat its process of withering 
away if left unaided to its fate in its competitive capitalistic field. 
Let us examine briefly those areas of shipping policy which promote the 
operation of our merchant marine and thereby the employment of American 
seamen. 
OPERATIONAL PREFERENCFS 
Operating-differential subsidy• Title VI of the Merchant 
Marint Act of 1936, as amended, sets forth the provisions for the 
operating-differential subsidy, as follows: 
1. Essential trade routes. The United States Maritime 
Commission has designated 31 routes between ports of the United States 
and certain foreign ports as "essential for the promotion, development, 
expansion, and maintenance of the foreign commerce of the United 
States.''* To receive a subsidy, a shipping company must be certified 
as the operator on one of the prescribed essential trade routes listed 
below: 
Atlantic Coast ports to East Coast of South America. 
Atlantic Coast ports to West Coast of South America. 
Atlantic Coast ports to East Coast of MeXico. 
Atlantic Coast ports to Caribbean area. 
North Atlantic ports to United Kingdom and Eire. 
* 87, p. 14 
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Bilbao), 
North Atlantic ports to Scandinavia and Baltic Sea, 
North Atlantic ports to Antwerp-Hamburg range, 
North Atlantic ports to Atlantic France and Spain (Vigo to 
North Atlantic ports to Mediterranean, Black Sea, Portugal, 
Spain (South of Portugal), Morocco (Casablanca to Tangiers). 
South Atlantic ports to United Kingdom, Bordeaux/Hamhurg, 
Scandinavia, and Baltic Sea. 
Atlantic ports to Far East. 
Gulf and South Atlantic ports to Mediterranean, Black Sea, 
Portugal, and Atlantic Spain. 
Atlantic and Gulf ports to West Coast of Africa, 
Atlantic ports to South and East Africa and Madagascar, 
Gulf ports to South and East Africa and Madagascar. 
Atlantic and Gulf ports to Australasia, 
Atlantic and Gulf ports to Straits Settlements, Netherlands 
East Indies, 
Atlantic and Gulf ports to India, Persian Gulf, Red Sea. 
Gulf ports to Caribbean and East Coast of Mexico. 
Gulf ports to East Coast of South America, 
Gulf ports to United Kingdom, Bordeaux/Hamburg, Scandinavia, 
and Baltic Sea, 
Gulf ports to Far East. 
Vacific ports to Caribbean and East Coast of Mexico. 
Pacific ports to East Coast of South America, 
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l1exico. 
Pacific ports to West Coast of South America, Central America, 
Pacific ports to United Kingdom. 
Pacific ports to Bordeaux/Hamburg, Scandinavia, and Baltic Sea. 
Pacific ports to Australasia. 
Pacific ports to Straits Settlements, Netherlands East Indies, 
India, Persian Gulf, Red Sea. 
California ports to Far East. 
Washington/Oregon ports to Far East. 
Gulf ports to West Coast of South America. 
Section 211 of the 1936 Act acknowledges the dynamic nature of 
foreign trade by providing flexibility in the formulation of the above 
list. The Federal Maritime Board may delete, add, or chan~e existing 
routes as trade conditions warrant. 
2. Eligibility. A bona fide steamship company is 
eligible for a subsidy if the company operates, or proposes to operate, 
its American-built ships on an essential trade route for the promotion 
of the country's foreign connnerce in competition with foreign-flag ships. 
3. Control over subsidized voyages. Congress manifests 
its intent to foster foreign commerce each year as it authorizes a 
number of voyages available for subsidy in excess of the number of 
applicants. 
4. Control over obsolescence. By restricting subsidies 
to vessels less than 20 years old, the Federal Maritime Board believes 
an incentive will exist for the replacement of vessels over 20 years old 
by new, modern and faster ships. 
25 
5. Subsicty payments. To offset the uneconomic status of 
the American Merchant Marine, the Federal Maritime Board computes and 
arranges payment for the difference between .b.merican and estimated 
foreign ship operations, including labor costs, insurance costs, 
maintenance, repairs not covered by insurance, and other costs which may 
be approved. 
6. Recapture provisio!!• To qaalify for subsidy payments 
the ship operator must agree to the recapture of excess profits by the 
government which entails pa;yment to the government of 50 per cent of the 
comp9nY 1s profits above a 10 per cent ceiling of the company's annual 
capital necessarily used in all phases of the subsidized business. This 
recapture is limited to (a) commencement after 10 years of subsidy 
payments, (b) eligibility only if the company's profits have been above 
10 per cent on an average during the period, and (c) a total equal to 
the operating subsidy payments received from the government. 
7. Depreciation reserve. To provide for replacement 
vessels and thereby maintain a constant fleet of modern, well-equipped 
vessels, each subsidy recipient must agree to set up a capital reserve 
fund into which the company must deposit each year the depreciation of 
the subsidized vessels as well as insurance and indemnity returns, A 
savings clause allows a defen1ent of the depreciation when company 
earnings are inadequate, but these deferments must be paid in years of 
healthier earnings in addition to the current depreciation deposits. 
B. Excess profits reserve fund, Subsidized operators 
must deposit into a special reserve fund all profits •:hich excsed 10 per 
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cent a year above the amounts deposited into the depreciation reserve. 
Withdrawals from the excess profits fund are limited to {a) depreciation 
deposits as described above, (2) payments to cover current losses 
suffered on subsidized operation after entering into an operating-
differential contract, (c) reimbursements of losses suffered on any 
completed, subsidized voyage during the year if it is certain that the 
proceeds from other voyages of the same year will not counter-balance 
the losses, and (d) withdrawals for distribution as special dividend to 
stockholders or bonus to officers and employees of the company, provided 
the amount on hand in the excess profits fund exceeds 5 per cent of the 
company's operating capital. 
9. Excess profits tax. The subsidized operator is required 
to pay taxes to the government on his excess profits only when he 
withdraws them from the excess profits reserve fund for dividend or bonus 
payments. These excess profits are exempt from taxation in the year they 
are earned and deposited into the excess profits reserve fund. 
Cabotage monopo1y. Another example of the policy of the United 
States Government to sustain its merchant marine and provide employment 
for American seamen is the restriction of cabotage to American-flag 
vessels. Cabotage may be defined as trade within national territory, 
including the coastwise, intercoastal, and non-contigous (as Alaska, 
Hawaii) trades. The United States is neither the instigator nor the sole 
participant of this monopolistic national policyi France, Finland, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, and the U.s.s.R. also restrict their domestic trade to 
their respective merchant fleet.* 
* 15, P• 112-13 
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Vessels operating on the domestic trade routes of the United 
States receive no subsidies comparable to those granted to foreign-
trade operator& because the competitors of the coastwise and inter-
coastal vessels are American railroads and truck companies. However, 
the steamship companies enjoy the advantage of operating freedom 
compared to the trucks and railroads whose rates and performances are 
regulated b,y the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Table IV provides a comparison of the domestic trade with the 
foreign trade in tenns of the various classes of vessels. An evaluation 
of the components of the table also indicates the job potential for 
American seamen in the two areas of employment. In 1957 the domestic-
trade fleet of tankers was 3 times as large as the foreign-trade tanker 
fleet b,y gross tonnage and it dominated the domestic trade, having 68 per 
cent of the total tonnage plying domestic routes. In the comparisons 
between the classes of vessels, those in foreign trade are larger and 
accordingly offer more jobs to seamen. By tonnage, there are about 3 
times as many freighters and 8 times as many combination passenger and 
cargo vessels in United States foreign trade which has 63 per cent of the 
total of all classes of vessels in both trades. This anazysis reflects 
the status of tankers in international trade. Since tankers are 
ineligible for operating-differential subsiqy, competitive pressure b,y 
foreign-flag tankers causes them to find more lucrative operations under 
the shield of cabotage monopoly. 
ShiPping conferences. Despite historical opposition to 
monopolistic practices, the United States Government has conceded to the 
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TABLE IV 
E21PLOIMENT OF UNITED STATES-FLAG MERCHANT SHIPS 
AS OF JUNE 30, 1957 
u. S. DOMESTIC TRADE u. s. FOREIGN TRADE 
DEAD- DEAD-
GROSS "WEIGHT GROSS "WEIGHT 
CLASS OF VESSEL NUMBER TONS TONS NUMBER TONS TONS 
Freighters 161 1,125 1,675 637 4,808 6,886 
Tankers 235 2,462 3,891 65 838 1,330 
Combination Passenger 
and Cargo 3 56 30 38 438 363 
TOTAL 399 3,64.3 5,596 740 6,084 8,579 
Source: United States Department of Commerce: Annual Report of the 
Federal Maritime Board and Maritime Adnliilistration, 1957. 
Washington: G. P. o., 1957. P• 54. 
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poliqy of shipping conferences under certain conditions in the interests 
of the shipping operators and American seamen. Shipping conferences, 
which date back to the Calcutta Conference established in 1875, are a 
form of international regulation against the abuses of excessive cornpe-
tition.* They perform on an international scale functions comparable to 
those of a regulating authority, such as the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, within national boundaries. Their mission entails a variety 
of objectives, among which are dependable service, equality for all 
shippers, rate stability, elimination of cutthroat competition, steady 
level of cargo, and economical operations by standardization for the 
mutual benefit of shippers and operators. 
United States-flag ships participate in over 100 freight 
conferences which operate within the confines set forth by the Shipping 
Act of 1916 and the Merchant Marine Acts of 1920 and 1936•"''* Under 
these laws~ the United States will not tolerate American ship participa-
tion in aqy conference which permits rebates to shippers, retaliation 
against shippers, preferential rates on the basis of freight tonnage, or 
discrimination against ports. 
Given the highest-paid shipboard personnel on the seas, the 
United States can least afford non-participation in conferences whose 
cartel-like provisions do not extend to the abuses listed above. Let's 
face the issue squarezy: The uneconomic position of the United States; 
maritime industr,r calls for less competitive practices and more 
stability as offered by shipping conferences. 
* 5, P• 95 
** 6, P• 218-21 
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Cargo preferences. The so-called "50-50 Cargo Preference Law'" 
refers to Public Law 664 of 1954 which, as an amendment to the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936, requires the transportation of 5o per cent of 
government financed, non-re:!Jnbursable shipments abroad on "privatezy-
owned United States-flag commercial vessels to the extent such vessels 
are available at fair and reasonable rates for United States-flag 
commercial vessels, in such manner as will insure a fair and reasonable 
participation of United States-flag commercial vessels in such cargoes 
qy geographical areas • • • n Except for shipments qy the Panama Canal 
Comp~, a government-owned corporation, cargo preference applies to 
such government-financed shipments as militar.y cargoes for the United 
States: armed forces and their allies, International Corporation 
Administration cargoes for economic assistance, and cargoes resulting 
from loans qy the Export-Import Bank. 
The financial :ilnportance of the "50-5011 law to the maritime 
indistry as substantial. Professor Gorter estimated in his definitive 
monograph that':Ainerican bottoms carried about 13.2 million tons of 
cargoes each year during the 1952-54 period, an amount "Which represented 
about two-fifths of total exports.* The International Cooperation 
Administration alone contributed aver $1 billion of which $750 million, 
or 6 per cent above the 50 per cent minimum, accrued under the statute's 
provisions to United States-flag vessels•** 
* 4, P• 110 
** 82, P• 20-65 and 83, P• 1-37 
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A REVIEW OF Slffi'mJY PAYMENTS 
Not all American-flag. American-built ships receive operating-
differential subsidies. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 excludes 
tankers. tramps• and vessels operating on coastwise. intercoastal. and 
non-contiguous routes. other operators who could qualifY prefer to 
dispense with the subsidies rather than submit to the recapture clause. 
Their attitude indicates their belief that the,y can fight the competitive 
battle without a government-furnished shield against unequal labor costs. 
Table V lists the operators. the number of ships. and the 
contract dates as of June 30• 1957. Fifteen steamship companies 
received subsidies subject to recapture for operating 301 American-built 
ships on essential trade . routes. Prominent in shipping circles but non-
subsidized in operation - much to the surprise of mazzy- taxpa;vers - are 
Isbrandtsen Compaizy"• Matson Navigation Compaizy"• Pope & Talbot• and 
United Fruit Compaizy"o 
The annual reports of the United States Maritime Commission 
and its successon, the Federal Maritime Board and Maritime Administra-
tion• reveal that our government has paid in operating subsidies about 
5 million dollars a year from 1937 to World War II and from the start of 
the war to 1951 an average of approximate:cy 30 million dollars a year. 
The operating-differential subsidies listed as payable to each subsidized 
operator at the end of each fiscal year on the statements of operations 
of the Federal Maritime Board and Maritime Administration are merely 
estimates because the net amount can be detennined only after the 
completion of the recapture period which usually runs 10 years. 
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TABU: V 
OPERATING-DIFFERENTIAL SUBSIDY AGREEMENTS 
AS OF JUNE 30, 1957 
EXPIRATION 
OPERATOR DATE 
American Banner Lines, Inc. Dec. 31, 1977 
American Export Lines, Inc. Dec. 31, 1965 
American Mail Line, Ltd. Dec. 31, 1960 
American President Lines, Ltd. Dec. 31, 1976 
Bloomfield Steamship Co. Dec. 31, 1963 
Farrell Lines, Inc. Dec. 31, 1959 
Grace Line, Inc. Dec. 31, 1977 
Gulf & South American 
Steamship Co., Inc. Dec. 31, 1963 
~es Bros, Steamship Co., Inc• Dec. 31, 1957 
Mississippi Shipping Co., Inc. Dec. 31, 1957 
Moo~cCormack Lines, Inc. Dec. 31, 1977 
The Oceanic Steamship Co. Dec. 31, 1972 
Pacific Far East Lines, Inc. Dec. 31, 1962 
Pacific Transport Lines, Inc. Dec. 31, 1962 
United States Lines Co: 
Cargo Service Dec. 31, 1965 
SS America Aug. 1, 1958 
SS United States June 19, 1967 
TOTAL 
NUMBER OF SHIPS 
PASSENGER AND 
C0!1BINATION 
1 
6 
5 
2 
11 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
34 
Source: Annual Report of the Federal Maritime Board and Maritime 
Administration, 1957. Appendix c, p. 58. 
CARGO 
24 
9 
16 
4 
l4 
16 
4 
54 
ll 
43 
4 
9 
5 
54 
267 
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According]¥, the net amounts compiled at the end of the combined first 
recapture periods in the history of the operating-subsidy payments under 
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 should present a truer picture of the 
government's outl~. Table VI contains these net amounts, distorted b,r 
the effects of World War II which disrupted normal trade and caused the 
termination of 2 contracts• the Oceanic Steamship Compaqy and United 
States Lines Compaqy, after 5 years of operation. The 21 million dollar 
total for this period averaged approximate]¥ 2 million dollars annual]¥. 
In 1953 our national budget allotted almost 6 billion dollars for all 
forms of subsidy aid to all industries. The 164 million dollar 
component of this total allocated to overall merchant marine aid - not 
just operating-differential subsidies - consisted of onzy 3 per cent of 
the national subsidy.* On this basis, at least, the maritime industry 
as a whole is not an undue strain upon the nation's purse, much less the 
cost of the operating-differential component which is related to labor 
costs. 
TREND OF Fl1l'URE SUPPORT 
At the date of this thesis our government exhibits no 
indication of curtailing aid to the maritime industry despite the largest 
public debt in the history of our nation. The onzy rumbling on the 
horizon is the speculation that guided-missile, nuclear weapons would 
achieve such horrible efficiency that nations could be wiped out within 
a few ~s, thereb,r precluding the need for long supp:cy lines of ocean-
going vessels. 
* 31 P• 16 
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TABLE VI 
COST TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR FIRST RECAPTURE PERIODS 
ENDING ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER 31, 1950# 
(IN THOUSANDS) 
TOTAL 
ESTIMATED 
SUBSIDY 
ACCRUAL## 
American Export Lines, Inc $5,308 
American Mail Line, Ltd 4,138 
American President Lines, Ltd 14,224 
Farrell Lines, Inc 4,583 
Grace Line Inc 6,588 
Lykes Bros, Steamship Co., Inc 8,480 
Mississippi Shipping Co., Inc 2,427-
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc 11,185 
New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Co 2,289 
The Oceanic Steamship Co 2,431 
Seas Shipping Co., Inc 2,413 
United States Lines Co 6,041 
70,106 
# Based on tentative settlements 
ESTIMATED 
RECAPTURED 
ACCRUAL 
$5,308 
1,644 
8,814 
1,100 
4,797 
8,480 
2,427 
11,185 
1,156 
551 
2,413 
1,120 
49,102 
ESTIMATED 
COST TO THE 
GOVERNMENT 
$2,493 
5,310 
3,483 
1,790 
1,133 
1,874 
4,921 
21,004 
##The amounts in this column represent total payments applicable to the 
prewar period (i.e., period prior to calendar year (1943) and to 
estimate accruals applicable to the postwar period (i.e., subsequent 
to calendar year 1946). 
Source: United States Department of Commerce: Annual Report of the 
Federal Maritime Board and Maritime Administrationt 1952. 
Washington, D.c. G. P. o., 19$2. Appendix I, P• 3. 
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Rowever, Navy Secretary Thomas S. Gates, Jr., speaking before 
the Rouse Merchant Marine Committee, asserted the position of the 
Department of Defense, "A large, modern and well balanced .American 
Merchant Marine is positive:cy vital to our defense planning • • • With-
out it, neither the military effort nor the war econonzy- of our nation 
could be supported."* 
On another front, Clarence G. Morse, Maritime Administrator 
and Chairman of the Federal Maritime Board, announced a general 
tightening in the rules for ship transfers to foreign flags. Making no 
acknowledgment of the intensive campaigns by seamen's unions in 
opposition to the transfers and attendant loss of jobs, he declared the 
intent of the policy revisions to be increased assurance of readil;}r 
available ships in a national emergency •** 
The 85th Congress passed 3 bills which warrant bread-and butter 
classification for sustained level of employment in the maritime 
industry. First, the new, 4-yearextension of reciprocal foreign trade 
enhances this nucleus of shipping; second, the 3.3 billion dollars in 
foreign aid assures substantial cargoes and emplqyment of seamen under 
the "50-50" law; and finall;r, the 2.25 billion dollars allotted for 
disposal of fann surplus provides further impetus to employment because 
of the bulk nature of the wheat, rice, and cotton cargoes under the 
"50-50"' paw.ision during its program extension to December 31, 1959.*** 
* 33, P• a 
** 70, Section 5, P• 13 
*** 72, P• 2 
Undoubte~, world conditions are a salient factor in the 
determination of subsidies affecting labor costs in the United States 
Herchant Harine. The succeeding chapter includes the stand of seamen's 
unions toward goverrnnent aid independent of the influence of inter-
national crises. 
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CHAPI'ER IV 
VIEWPOINTS OF SEAMEN'S UNIONS 
Maritime labor leaders look upon rising prices as a whip which 
incessant]¥ lashes them irrto conflict with management for higher wages 
to match the rising cost of living. They do not press for arbitrary 
maximums in basic wages; instead they bargain for wage increases slight]¥ 
above amounts calculated to satisfy their members, yet below the poirrt 
of complete resistance by management.* 
SEAMEN'S WAGES 
American standard of livi.rJ&• The American seaman compares his 
wages with those of his fellow citizen ashore, not with the pay of 
foreign seamen. He makes this comparison as he conscious]¥ or uncon-
scious]¥ decides between a job at sea or ashore, following the II"inciple 
that labor will always select better jobs over poorer ones.** Since the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and related navigation laws of the United 
States insist upon American citizen shipboard personnel, it follows that 
the seaman's wages must be on par with comparable shore jobs if American-
flag vessels are to be manned. Given the highest standards of living 
among all nations in the world and the current wage-price spiral, it is 
not surprising that the leaders of maritime unions face an insatiable 
propensity to adjust to still higher wage levels. Charts I and II 
* ll, P• 236-37 
** ll, P• 209 
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portray the wage-price spiral in the United States, Great Britain, West 
Ge:rmaey-, France, Ita.l;r, and Sweden. These inflation curves, which 
started about 1956, show a milder inflation in the United States than in 
the other countries. In Great Britain and West Ge:rmaey-, wages have gone 
up about 55 per cent while prices lag at a rise of about 40 per cent. 
There is less of a gap in Ita.l;r: wages up about 40 per cent, prices up 
about 30 per cent. Sweden has higher inflation with wages up 71 per 
cent and rrices up 42 per cent. France has experienced the widest gap: 
wages up 89 per cent, prices up 32 per cent. The wage-price spiral 
strains the econonzy- of each country in direct proportion to the gap 
between these two factors. The milder inflation curve in the United 
States does not indicate a less demanding wage objective for American 
labor unions because the American base wage is the highest of all. It 
does, however, reflect a more realistic attitude on the part of American 
unions compared to those which have seriousl;r widened the gap between 
wages and prices b,r sheer strength rather than economic considerations.* 
Base wages. The Seafarers International Union negotiated a 
labor contract, effective September 1, 1958, calling for an 8 per cent 
increase in base pay.. Tables· VII, VIII, and IX show the increase as it 
affects each rating of the three departments on board dry cargo ships, 
passenger ships, and tankers. The new scale represents a long hike from 
the 1939 rates of $82.50 for ordinary seaman and $87.50 for able seaman. 
Inflation has helped push this new scale to its peak of about 340 per 
cent and 400 per cent for these ratings in 1958. In comparison, the 
*78, P• 46 
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TABLE VII 
DRY CARGO VESSEL WAGE SCALFJ/ 
DECK DEPARTMENT 
NKw 
OLD NEW OVER-
RATING SCALE INCREASE SCALE TIME 
- - -
Bosun (Mariner) $478.74 $38.30 $517.04 $2.23 
Bosun 429.13 34.33 463.46 2.23 
##Carpenter (Mariner) 413.41 33.07 446.48 2.23 
##Carpenter 401.71 32.14 433.85 2.23 
AB Maintenance 368.40 29.47 397.87 2,18 Quartemaster 336.73 26.94 363.67 2,18 
Able Seaman 336.73 26.94 363.67 2.18 
Ordinary Seaman 261.53 20.92 282.45 1.70 
ENGINE DEPARTMENT 
Chief Electrician (Mariner) 554.87 43.39 598.26 2.23 
Chief Electrician 534.70 42.78 577.48 2.23 
2nd Electrician 498.ll 39.85 537.96 2.23 
Unlicensed Jr. Eng, (D~) 432.50 34.60 467.10 2.23 
Unlicensed Jr. Eng. (Watch) 386.82 30.95 417.71 2.23 
Plumber - Machinist 443.84 35.51 479.35 2.23 
Deck Engineer 407.92 32.63 440.55 2.23 
Engine Utility 392.76 31.42 424.18 2.23 
Evaporator Maintenance 358.o6 28,64 386.70 2.18 
Oiler 336.73 26.94 363.67 2.18 
Oiler - Diesel 364.38 29.15 393.53 2,18 
Watertender 336.73 26.94 363.67 2.18 
Fireman - Watertender 336.73 26.94 363.67 2.18 
Fireman 336.73 26.94 363.67 2.18 
Wiper 315.20 25.22 340.42 1.70 
Reefer Engineer-
(When 1 carried) 498.11 39.85 537.96 2.23 
Reefer Engineer-
(When 3 carried) 
Chief 459.43 36.75 496.18 2.23 
lst Assistant 408.63 32.69 441.32 2.23 
2nd Assistant 371.32 29.71 401,03 2,18 
TABLE VII 
DRY CARGO VESSEL WAGE SCALEQ (Continued 
STEWARD DEPARTMENT 
NEW 
OLD NEW OVER-
RATING SCALE INCREASE SCALE TIME 
- - -
Chief Steward (Mariner) $478.74 $38.30 $517.04 $2.23 
Chief Steward 429.13 34.33 463.46 2.23 
Chief Cook 392.18 31.37 423.55 2.23 
Night Cook & Baker 386,82 30.85 417.77 2.23 
Second Cook 348.36 27.87 376.23 2,18 
Third Cook 332.47 26.60 359.07 2,18 
Messman 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Utilityman 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
# For new Seatrain Line wage scale, add $7.50 to new scale above on all 
ratings c.arried except chief electrician and deck engineer. New 
Seatrain scale for chief electrician is $589.98; for deck engineer, 
$479.67. 
##Receives $20 additional a month if required to provide own tools. 
Standby rates have been increased to $2.14, $2.18 and $2.23 for the 
respective groups, 
Source: Seafarers Internation Union: Seafarers Log, August 29, 
1958, P• 3. 
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TABLE VII 
PASSENGER SHIP WAGE SCALFJ/ 
DECK DEPARTMENT 
NEW 
OLD NEW OVER-
RATING ~ INCREASE SCALE !ll:1!.. 
Bosun $504.19 $40.34 $544.5.3 $2.2.3 
Bosun's Mate .396.77 .31.74 428.51 2.2.3 
Carpenter 422.51 .3.3.80 456 • .31 2.23 
Deck Storekeeper .375.42 .30.0.3 405.1..5 2.18 
Watchman 
.336.7.3 26.94 .363.67 2.18 
ENGINE DEPARTMENT 
Chief Electrician (Del Mar) 576.72 46.14 622.86 2.23 
2nd Electrician (Del Mar) 498.11 39.85 531.96 2.23 
3rd Electrician (Del Mar) 447.54 35.80 483.34 2.23 
Chief Electrician (Alcoa) 534.70 42.78 577.48 2.23 
STEWARD DEPARTMENT 
Chief Steward 577.35 46.19 623.54 2.23 
2nd Steward 405.89 32.47 438.36 2.23 
Headwaiter 362.04 28.96 391.00 2.18 
Smoking Room Steward 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Bartender 297.12 23.82 .321.54 1.70 
Deck Steward 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Linenkeeper 267.17 21 • .37 288.54 1.70 
Storekeeper 363.95 29.12 39.3.07 2.18 
Chief Stewardess 297.72 2.3.82 321.54 1.70 
Stewardess 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Chief Cook 497.97 39.84 537.81 2.23 
2nd Cook 425.72 34.o6 459.78 2.23 
3rd Cook 394.75 31.58 426.3.3 2.23 
4th Cook 340.58 27.25 367.83 2.18 
Larder Cook 425.72 34.o6 459.78 2.2.3 
Crew Cook 404.89 32.39 437.28 2.23 
Butcher 1.138.83 35.11 473.94 2.23 
Chief Baker 486.o6 38.88 524.94 2.23 
2nd Baker 420.57 33.65 454.22 2.23 
Chief Pantryman 386.82 30.95 417.77 2.23 
TABLE VIII 
PASSENGER SHIP WAGE SCALEH (Continued) 
STEWARD DEPARTMENT 
NE'.v 
OLD NEW OVER-
RATING SCALE INCREASE SCALE TIME 
2nd Pantryman $332.47 $26.60 $359.07 $2.18 
Night Pantryman 282.44 22.60 305.04 1.70 
Night Steward 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Bedroom Steward 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Bath Steward 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Officers' Bedroom Steward 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Waiter 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Saloon Porter 264.12 21.13 285.25 1.70 
Night Porter 264.12 21.13 285.25 1.70 
Messman 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Steward Utility 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Assistant Cook 332.47 26.60 359.07 2.18 
Dishwasher 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Po twas her 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Assistant Pantryman 282.44 22.60 305.04 1.70 
Assistant Baker 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Bellman 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Glor,yhole Steward 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Night Cook 405.89 32.47 438.36 2.23 
Galley Utility 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Saloon Steward 274.81 21.98 296.79 1.70 
Printer-Porter 264.12 21.13 285.25 1.70 
Porter 264.12 21.13 285.25 1.70 
Laundryman 282.44 22.60 305.04 1.70 
#When the respective ratings are carried. Ratines not listed follow 
the standard dr,y cargo wage scale. 
Source: Seafarers International Union: Seafarers Log, August 291 
1958, P• 10. 
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TABLE IX 
TAII'KER WAGE SCALE 
DECK DEPARTMENT 
NEW 
OLD NEl-l OVER-
RA.TING ~ INCREASE SCALE TIME 
-
Bosun $441.35 $35.31 $476.66 $2.23 
AB Maintenance 379.53 20.36 409.89 2.18 
Quartermaster 347.85 27.83 375.68 2.18 
Able Seaman 340.44 27.24 367.68 2.18 
Ordinary Seaman 268.81 21.50 290.31 1.70 
OS Maintenance 315.20 25.22 340.42 1.70 
ENGINE DEPARTMENT 
Electrician 534.70 42.78 577.48 2.23 
Chief Pumpman 463.73 37.10 500.83 2.23 
2nd Pumpman/Maintenance 463.73 37.10 500.83 2.23 
2nd Pumpman/Machinist 463.73 37.10 500.83 2.23 
Engine Utility 385.35 30.83 416.18 2.18 
Oiler 340.44 27.24 367.68 2.18 
Fireman/Watertender 340.44 27.24 367.68 2.18 
Wiper 315.20 25.22 340.42 1.70 
STEWARD DEPARTMENT 
Chief Steward 441.35 35.31 476.66 2.23 
Chief Cook 407.32 32.59 439.91 2.23 
Cook and Baker 401.97 32.16 434.13 2.23 
3rd Cook 354.72 28.38 383.10 2.18 
Messman 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Utilityman 259.52 20.76 280.28 1.70 
Source: Seafarers Internation Union: Seafarers Log, August 29, 
1958, P• 10. 
base wages in the Norwegian maritime industr,y had surged over the 1939 
base 328 per cent b.r 1952.* A comparison between these new rates and 
those of similar jobs ashore reveals the aim of maritime labor for 
parity with shoreside jobs. For example, the new overtime rates for 
carpenter and ordinar,y seaman ('llho paints among other duties) are $2.23 
and $1.70 per hour. The basic wages for the shoreside maintenance 
carpenter, painter, and helpers are $2.22, $196, and $1.83 per hour 
respective:cy.** 
Fringe benefits. As other workers do, the seaman earns more 
than the basic wage which resolves itself into take-home pey after 
various deductions. Fringe benefits and premium pay have increased 
substantial:cy in importance to unions and in costs to management during 
the last decade in American iildilstries. For example, wages have 
increased 67 per cent in manufacturing industries in the last 10 years 
while fringe costs have spiraled more than 200 per cent.*** Union 
leaders who face an impasse concerning wage increase at the bargaining 
table find additional fringes or premium pay a substitute satisfactor,y 
to the members. The strike cy the 1,300-member Masters, Mates and Pilots 
Union, idling about 40 ships along the east coast of the United States in 
October, 1958, is a good illustration of the emphasis placed upon fringe 
benefits ey unions and management. The recess in negotiations and the 
implementation of the strike were due to disagreements over vacation, 
:oension, and welfare benefits. There was no quarrel over wages.**** 
* 56, P• 3 
** 89, P• 9 
*** 19, P• 82 
**** 62, P• 1 
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Fringes in all industries include a variety of benefits such as paid 
vacations and holidays, paid lunch periods and coffee breaks, medical. 
and hospital insurance, and pensions. As union leaders have resorted 
more and more to fringe benefits as supplements to wages in each 
contract, or deliberate~ concentrated on this new area, costs to 
management have exceeded 17 billion dollars in the United States during 
the 1948-1958 decade. In overall American industry and business, 
fringes cost about 29 cents an hour in 1958 compared with ll cents in 
To induce the seaman to ship out on voyages in preference to 
a job ashore, maritime unions, mindful of their own survival, must 
assume the task of writing into their labor contracts fringe benefits at 
least on a par with shoreside jobs. Seamen's unions have been more 
active than their shoreside counterparts in the crystallization of this 
salient component of the seaman's pay: The cost to management has 
increased from 2.6 per cent of basic wages in 195] to 8.4 per cent as of 
January 1, 1957.** In periods of war our government divides the shipping 
lanes into various zones of danger, calculated to increase the basic 
wage by factors ranging as high as lOO per cent for maximum peril. These 
war bonuses encourage the seaman to ship on vessels destined to dangerous 
areas with vital cargoes. During the Taiwan crisis in 1958, maritime 
unions negotiated war-like bonuses covering seamen sailing in Formosan 
waters, 'Which included 100 per cent bonus on base pay, $150 vessel 
* 79, P• 82-86 
** 88, P• 2 
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attack bonus or a $100 harbor attack bonus, and life insurance of 
$101 000 per seaman.* 
Subsistence and lodging• Perhaps the foremost in importance, 
yet the one most often underrated, is the value of food and lodging. 
Certai!Lcy", these two common factors of every day life weigh heaviJ.¥ in 
the budget of the worker ashore. The American seaman pays nothing 
be,rond his personal services for the additional increment of food and 
lodging except his Social Security FICA p~ents which are calculated 
on the basis of their value plus his wages. For income tax purpose, 
the value of these fringes is exluded from taxable income. 
Vacation Pgl• The Seafarers International Union negotiated a 
contract which calls for an additional $100 in vacation pay, increasing 
the annual rate to $360, effective September l, 1958. This fringe 
benefit costs management 30 cents per man per day and is the equivalent 
of l month1s base wages for seamen at the level of able seaman or 
fireman-watertender. Eligibility to receive vacation pay is not impaired 
by sailing on several ships. A seaman qualifies for one-fourth of the 
vacation pay benefit each 90 days on service. The growth of the seaman•s· 
vacation pay schedule reflects the activity and desire of maritime labor 
leaders to keep abreast of fringe benefits ashore: $176 in 1954, $244 in 
1955, $260 in 1956, and $36o .in 1958.** In comparison, vacations for 
workers ashore have expanded from an average of l week with pay in 1940 
to a minimum of 2 weeks in 1958, with the majority receiving 3 weeks per 
year.*** 
* 47, P• 2 
** 42 P• ) 
*** 19, P• 84-86 
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HolidayS• Under many union contracts, seamen enjoy 9 holidays 
a year.* Shore workers have llllUzy" contracts which list ll holidays, but 
the average is 7 a year.** 
Employment security. This fringe benefit provides $30 week:cy-, 
or $15 if the unemployed seaman is eligible for state unemployment 
COill?ensation. To qualify, a seaman must be employed by reason of 
shipwreck, ship lay-up, ship sale or transfer, reduction of ship's 
crews, disability recove:ey periods, and other special circumstances.*** 
Workers ashore enjoy the benefits of state unemployment compensation. 
Pension. Before 1953, the seaman who enjoyed pension benefits 
participated in comp!UV plans which embraced all personnel, whether at 
sea or ashore. Since 1953, maritime unions have incorporated this wage 
component in their contracts, divided into 4 categories: (1) normal, 
(2) ear:cy-, {3) reduced, or (4) disability. Pension pa;yments range from 
$100 per month for normal or full t:e nsions to a point between $50 and 
$95 per month for ear:cy-, reduced, or disability annuities.*** 
Welfare. .As indicated by the title, welfare plans include a 
variety of benefits, as followst insurance covering life, accident, and 
dismemberment; hospital. care; surgical expenses; medical and hospital 
coverage for dependents; maternity benefits; disability compensation; 
unemployment subsistence; scholarships for dependents; job training; 
preventive medicine; health clinics; and funeral expenses.*** less than 
*57, P• 55 
** 19, P• 84-86 
*** 88, P• 2 
5o 
2.5 per cent of industrial worl<ers ashore have no health, insurance, or 
,:ension plans.* 
Other benefits. The seaman, along with other workers, 
qualifies for Social Security old-age benefits and, on some ships, 
unemployment compensation. Free medical and hospital benefits offered 
by the United States Public llealth Service are more than the average 
worl<er ashore enjoys. While the seaman has no specific provision for 
the two and a half regular rate for worl< on holidays and Sundays found 
in some jobs, he does have comparable benefits of time and a half 
for Saturdays, Sunda;ys, and holida;ys, plus additional overtime for 
perfonning other than routine worl< on these days. He earns this 
additional compensation for multiple reasons, receiving: extra pa;y for 
perfonning dirty or dangerous worl< in connection with prescribed penalty 
cargo, a portion of the wages of aqy missing seaman whose duties he 
takes over in addition to his own, and overtime or longshore rates for 
worl< outside the stipulated duties of his position.** 
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 
Stand of labor unions. It is not surprising that maritime 
unions wholeheartecicy" support the operational subsidy policy of our 
govermnent and advocate its expansion as insurance for more jobs•*** In 
their efforts to keep abreast of the wages and fringe benefits of the 
shoreside .American worl<er, maritime labor leaders acknowledge that 
* 89, P• 16 · 
**51, P• 28-43, 62-78, 83-98, lOQ-118 
*** 48, P• 2 
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government aid is necessary to ptq the highest labor costs among all. 
seafaring nations.* Seventy-four cents of each subsidy dollar goes for 
the seaman's wages in support of this uneconomic labor cost.** 
Joseph Curran, president of the National Maritime Union (NMU), 
sees a distinct need for subsidies because seamen are employees of a 
11l!ick industry."' Our government has made a decision to support the 
maritime industry because of its importance to the nation during periods 
of international crises as well as its economic ill!portance as a S)urce 
of employment to American citizens. Another decision in the form of our 
navigation laws requires ship operators to man United States-flag ships 
with American citizens rather than obtain their labor in the cheapest 
market. In the light of these decisions, Curran looks beyond a 
comparison of American and foreign seamen wage scales and points to the 
constant loss of jobs by the transfer of United States-flag ships to 
foreign registry. With less than 75,000 jobs on board 1,400 ships in 
the industry, he recommends continuing, operational subsidies on a 
constructive basis to offset the economic conditions which induce ship 
transfers.*** 
The Seafarers International Union (SIU) also has actively 
opposed "runaw~qtt flags, the term for the transfer of United States-flag 
ships to registry under the flags of Liberia, Panama, Costa Rica, and 
Honduras. SIU accuses runaway operators of tax dodging.**** Using 
* 25, P• 139 
** 18, P• 24 
*** 19, P• 120-121 
"'*** 31, P• 5 
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Liberian registration a.s an example, the American onerator mere]J pays 
a registration fee to a Liberian maritime office which is convenientzy 
located in New York for this purpose. Our tax laws require payment of 
personal or corporate taxes on funds actualzy transferred to the 
American owners. However, financial benefits accrue to the American 
owners in the fonn of reinvesting tax-free earnings in other foreign 
ventures or receiving interest-free "loans" from the Liberian corporation. 
A concomitant of the American seamen's loss of jobs is the government's 
loss of tax revenue from their salaries in addition to the loss of tax 
revenue fram the operators in an industry lbich gladzy accepts the tax-
dollar in subsidies. 
This condition is not peculiar to the maritime industry; unions 
of other industries, face similar problems. The Threatrical Stage 
Employees Union has announced opposition to the making of motion 
pictures abroad as a scheme to avoid payment of wages to Americans and 
taxes to our government. The International Typographical Union has 
objected to the runaway practice of text-book printing b,r the University 
of California, a tax-supported institution.* 
A curious twist occurred in tramp shipping during 1958 when 
the Pegor Steamship Campaqy received permission from the Maritime 
Administration to return its Liberian-fiag ships to the American flag. 
The fall of the tramp shipping charter market below the foreign-flag 
operational minimum of $4.70 a ton and the availability of substantial 
government cargoes under the 1150-5011' law- at more than twice the foreign-
* 41, P• 1 
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flag rate promoted this "~' reversal. SIU did not orpose the 
return of the tramps which boosted job opportunities significantl;v, but 
it was not inarticulate as it noted the hunger of the former "runaways" 
to partake of the tax-supported 050-5011 cargoes.* 
Relative cost of the maritime subsidy. The maritime industry 
is not the only industry supported by the taxpayer. Without anal;vzing 
the relative value of each industry to the nation, weighted by periods 
of war and peace, a measure of the burden upon the .American citizen 
deserves anal;vsis to properly classify the maritime industry's position 
on the drain of public funds and possibly to preclude misconceptions 
arising from the use of the te1111, subsidized operations. 
Using 1953 as the basis for a single year evaluation, the 
maritime industry received for its overall program 164 million dollars 
out of a total subsidy of almost 6 billion allocated by our government 
for all industries, ~ich included support for cheese, hogs, peanuts, 
and potatoes. Looking at this expenditure from a different angle, the 
164 million, or 3 per cent of the total subsidy, allocated to the 
maritime industry means that 3 cents of each subsidy dollar supported 
shipping, while 97 cents helped the economic status of cheese, hogs, 
peanuts, and potatoes.** 
Expanding the basis for evaluation to a decade, as 1938-1948, 
the subsidy cost of the maritime industry was 35 million compared to 
67 million for cheese producers, 68 million for the wool industry, 132 
* 36, P• 3 
** 3, P• 16 
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million for potatoe producers, and 200 million for the milk and butter 
industries.* 
Fi~, enlarging our perspective to the two decades, 1936-
1956, we have for consideration the statement of the nation's Maritime 
Administrator who announced that the subsidies to our merchant marine 
during this period have, in reality, cost our government "a great, big, 
round zero."' Clarence G. Morse, Maritime Administrator and Chairman of 
the Maritime Board, explained his "bargain-basement priced" merchant 
marine ana.lysis by the fact that maritime employees have returned to the 
government in taxes more than $29,000,000 a year in personel income 
taxes - without mentioning the corporate returns. This revenue more 
than offset the subsidy cost to the government during the 1937 to 
June 30, 1956 period, amounting to $589,865,940 or an approximate annual 
average of $29,000,000. Morse also pointed out that another cost 
comparison of the interest charge at 4 per cent of the World War II cost 
of $l2,40o,ooo,ooo to build our merchant fleet would amount to 
$497,000,000 a year. He stated that the actual net subsidy to the 
maritime industry has averaged about $7,200,000 - 11a better than bargain-
basement price."** 
COOPERATION WITH MANAGEMENT 
Development of policy. During the early 1930's the maritime 
industry was rampant with sitdowns, quickies, and lack of discipline. 
* 18, P• 24 
** 71, P• 58M 
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There was little evidence of labor-management cooperation which is an 
effective tool for controlling and reducing labor costs. Out of this 
chaos, in the latter part of this decade, emerged a semblance of order 
and mutual cooperation, stemming from the emplqyment of industr,y-wide 
bargaining. 
NMU, which was formed on May 3, 1937, agreed to negotiate a 
contract with the .American Merchant Marine Institute, representing l6 
Atlantic coast NMU ships. The operators sponsored the American Merchant 
Marine Institute to promote unity in labor costs and to preclude the 
plBying of one company against another by the union. Subse~pent agree-
menta in the maritime industr,y used this contract as a model, spelling 
out in a similar manner the provisions for wages, hours, working 
conditions, and rights of labor and management.* 
SIU, chief rival of NMU, held its first constitutional 
conference in August, 1939, for the purpose of dividing the organization 
into districts. The Sailors Union of the Pacific took over the Pacific 
coast district, while SIO concentrated on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. 
B.r 1948, SIU had progressed to a membership of about 30,000 under 
contract to 29 dr,y cargo operators, 13 tanker companies, and 1 passenger 
ship company.** 
In 1951, almost all seamen were unionized in contrast to about 
50 per cent of shoreside worl<:ers employed under union agreement.*"* 
The policy of cooperation with management had cr,ystallized. NMU-chief 
* 15, P• 17-19 
** 12, P• 53-54 
*** 10, P• 164 
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Curran called for the industr,r to work for sound and reasonable labor-
management relations to promote industr,r growth and provide employment 
for seamen.* SIU exhibited a desire to advance cooperation with 
management b,y the inclusion of provisions in its constitution of 
.August, 1956, designed to promote efficiency and reduce costs, as 
follows: 
.Article XII sets forth the qualifications for officers, port 
agents, patrolmen, and other elective jobs to include among other 
requirements. at least 3 years of seatime, of which at least 4 months 
must be in the calendar year of election. This requirement assures the 
election of officers who have first-hand contact with time-consuming and 
costly circumstances on board ships • 
.Article XV establishes the machinery for trials and appeals b,y 
the union for certain offenses. 
Article XVI contains a list of offenses and penalties, sane 
of which pertain to cooperation with management, as follows: 
Section ~. Upon proof of the commission of the following 
offenses, the member shall be penalized up to a penalty of 
expulsion from the Union. In the event the penalty of expul-
sion is not envoked or recommended, the penalty shall not 
exceed suspension from the rights and privileges of membership 
for more than two years, or a fine of $50.00, or both: 
(g) Deliberate failure or refusal to join one's ship, or 
misconduct or neglect of duty aboard ship, to the detriment 
of the Union or its agreements; 
(h) Deliberate and unauthorzed interference, or 
deliberate and malicious villification, with regard to the 
execution of the duties of aqy office or job; 
* 19, P• 120 
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Section 3. Upon proof of the commission of any of the 
following offenseS', members shaD. be penalized up to suspen-
sion from the rights and privileges of membership for two 
years, or a fine of $So.oo, or both: 
(d) Refusal or negligent failure to carr,r out orders of 
those duly authorized to make such orders at any time. 
Section 4. Upon proof of the commission of any of the 
following offenses;, members shall be penalized up to a fine 
of $50.00: 
(c) Disorderly conduct at pay-off or sign-on; 
(g) Negligent failure to join ship. 
Disciplinary action. It is one thing to talk about coopera-
tion, another to act. A review of the trials conducted by SIU from 
November 16, 1956 to May 15, 1951 disclosed the fallowing offenses which 
affect the efficienqy of operations and increase costs~ 
Instructing a fellow seaman to fail to join. 
Failure to report for port watch. 
Failure to report for port watch second da;y. 
Drunkedness on board ship. 
Bringing whiskey on board ship. 
Threatening chief engineer. 
Villif,ying and threatening an officer. 
AWOL an 6 different occasions. 
Unable to perfonn duties due to own misconduct. 
Failure to return to ship. 
Neglect of duties. 
Drunk or unfit far dut,y. 
* 34, P• 8 
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The penalties for the above offenses were $SO for each count. 
In addition, a second offense case of a seaman who went ashore 
against orders and returned drunk, bringing whiskey against orders, 
drew the ,:enalty of a $SO fine plus 3 months suspension. 
Another case which involved neglect of duties at sea, 
returning to vessel drunk and unfit for duty, absence from duty without 
permission, under the influence of alcohol while at sea and unfit for 
duty, excessive drinking while at port and unfit for duty brought about 
the penalty of suspension for a period of 2 years • 
.Article 23 of NMU1s constitution contai.ns similar provisions 
for handling the problems of discipline and enforcement of rules and 
contract obligations of seamen whose confined environment or working, 
living, and eating together pose special problems not found ashore. The 
unions point to the penalties as eloquent testimo~ of their intent to 
cooperate with management to the full extent of their contract obliga-
tions to reduce operational costs. 
Expulsion of Communism. The maritime unions have followed the 
trend of our government's international position and have ousted the 
Communists from their memberships. The leaders consider their unions to 
be clean of anti-government tendencies, which tend to increase labor 
costs. 
The late Harry Lundeberg, who served as first president of SIU 
and as secretary-treasurer of the Sailors Union of the Pacific, was such 
an unrelenting foe of the Communists that they were never able to 
infiltrate significantly into his organization.* 
*12, P• 188 
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The Communists wormed a larger toe hole in NMU and struggled 
for control during 1947-1949. They were defeated and ousted from the 
union at the 1949 NMU convention.* Joseph Curren earned the distinction 
of association with James Carey of the International Union of the 
Electrical Workers and Roy Brewer of the International Association of 
Theatrical and State Employees as the 3 outstanding labor leaders who 
have demonstrated unusual ability in eliminating Communist influences.** 
Incidents of labor-management cooperation. NMU negotiated a 
revised employment clause with its contracted operators, represented b,y 
the American Merchant Marine Institute, which establishes a control over 
the re-hiring of undisciplined seamen. Given an operating cost of 
several hundred dollars a day (see Tables VII, VIII, and IX), delays 
incurred b,y waiting for AWOL seamen in foreign ports readily mount into 
significant costs. If the vessel sails without the missing seaman, the 
operators are liable for his maintenance and repatriation expenses. SIU 
took a dim view of this bargaining agreement, calling it an "industry-
wide blacklist•"*** 
SIU acted to assist management in the form of a $5001 000 loan 
to the Banner Line in 1958 when a S per cent cut in construction subsidy 
b,y the Maritime Administration threatened to curtail the company's 
operations and thereb,y bring about a reduction in jobs. It is 
interesting to note that NMU vigorously opposed the loan, unsuccessfully 
complaining to AFL-CIO President George Meany and the National Labor 
*12,p. 176 
- 3, p. 391 
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Relations Board that it was b~ond the scope of the ethical practices 
code•* 
Finally, the contract negotiations by 3 West Coast maritime 
unions in 1958 exhibited a keen understanding of the problems of 
management's labor costs during a recession. The unions agreed to a 
)-year contract without a wage increase, but with the understanding that 
a wage increase could be discussed again in 2 years.** 
CURRENT OBJECTIVES 
Benefits for seamen. "Motivation is highly complicated; the 
will to work is influenced by a variety of conditions of which penalties 
and rewards are but two. It is not true that five cents an hour will 
cure most gripes," asserted Professor Dale Yoder.*** 
In answer to the question concernin~ the wants of seamen, NMU-
president Curran listed such benefits as economic security to the extent 
of a decent, comfortable life, adequate health and medical care, full 
employment, and welfare programs as the goal of his union.**** 
SIU also stresses the need to keep abreast with the benefits 
accrued qy shoreside workers. Welfare benefits are an inte~ral objective 
of this union, as evidenced qy expenditures of a million and a half 
dollars in calendar year 1957 for the variety of benefits shown in 
Table X. 
* 40, P• 3, 11 
** 8o, p. 92 
*** J.4, Po 68 
**** 25, P• 138-140 
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TABLE X 
BENEFITS DIRECTLY PROVIDED TO MEMBERS 
SEAFARERS WELFARE FUND 
~e of Benefit 
ath 
Cash Disability 
Hospital 
Surgical 
Medical 
Unemployment 
Vacation 
Maternity 
Medical Examination Program 
Blood Transfusions 
Therapeutic Equipment 
Pensions or Retirement 
Seamen's Training School 
1957 
Motion Pictures at Marine Hospitals 
Cost of Fixed Assets Acquired For the Purpose 
of Providing Specific Benefits Under the Plan 
Scholarship Program 
Medical and Safety Program 
TOTAL 
Source: Seafarers Internation Union: Seafarers Log, 
June 20, 1958, P• 7. 
Benefit P~nts $ 283,86 • 2 
157,630.00 
307,789.66 
45,289.00 
8,756.50 
290,621.21 
-0-
90,400.00 
6,655.49 
643.00 
43.o6 
-0-
23,427.90 
2,296.50 
86,948.55 
19,195.64 
85,014.74 
$1,418,578.27 
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On June 1, 1958, SIU added another benefit to its growing 
list - free eyeglasses. With this addition, the United States Public 
Health Service and the SIU Welfare Plan combine to provide almost every 
possible medical need for the members at a cost of $21 per week to SIU. 
Benefits include free service at diagnostic clinics and special aids 
such as wheelchairs, artificial limbs, and other devices free of charge.* 
NHU is the only maritime union which has negotiated employment 
security, amounting to $40 a week for members when their vessels are 
tied up. To this unique benefit, NHU has added a novel $2,500 a year 
scholarship available for 4 years to members and their children.** 
As union leaders raise their sights on increased benefits, 
they accelerate operating costs. In 1956, operators of SIU-manned 
vessels contributed $1.05 per man per day toward welfare benefits, while 
operators uhder contract to NMU paid $1.00 per man per day for welfare 
benefits plus 25 cents per man per day toward the unique employment 
security.*** 
Haritime training. A salient objective of maritime unions is 
a well organized training program for unlicensed personnel operated by 
the government, ship operators, and unions•**** There is less need to 
include licensed personnel on the agenda because they receive the 
benefits ur established federal and state maritime training schools. 
The Haritime administration spent about $3 million in fiscal year 1957 
on its maritime training program. It has invested about $24 million in 
* 37, P• 15 
** 52, P• 3 and 53, P• 3 
*** 88, Table B 
**** 25, P• 140 
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maritime service training facilities at the United States Merchant 
Marine Acadeli\Y•* Public Law 415, 84th Congress, established the 
Acadeli\Y as a permanent institution. In its first full year of operation 
as such, 887 cadets received training; 233 were graduated in February 
and August, 1~57, receiving licenses as third mates or third assistant 
engineers - and for some applicants, NIIVal Reserve commissions as 
ensigns. In addition to the federal school, California, Maine, 
Massachusetts and New York operate state maritime academies. 
Management relations. In the list of objectives desired qy 
maritime unions, their leaders have included good management relations. 
They believe that labor-manage.ment cooperation is a logical step toward 
the attainment of full employment, economic security, and other aims.** 
This attitude alone reflects progress over the antipathy that existed in 
the 1940's When management expended funds for attorneys and agents to 
set up labor espionage on board ships and ashore to discharge union 
members, and the unions countered with equal:t;v cost:t;v measures to 
organize.*~~* 
Union efforts to improve management relations are focussed upon 
opposition to "runaway" ships, 'Which create foreign-flag competitors with 
lower labor costs:, and upon maritime unity designed to avoid costly 
delays in port.**** Of course, the direct result of 11 runawaystt is the 
loss of jobs qy American seamen. The maritime unity concept, however, 
·contemplates solving a variety of labor-management problems, particularly 
* 85, P• 21, 47, 48 
** 25, P• JhO 
*"* 8, P• 285 
**** $4, P• 5 
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before the,y aggravate into strikes over nebulous issues, such as the 
6-day strike in October, 1958, b,y the Masters, Mates, and Pilots against 
passenger and dr,y-cargo ships of east and gulf coast operators. 
Public relations. Maritime unions astutely measure the value 
of public support to their objectives. To this end and to improve 
communication, NMU publishes The NMU Pilot which is available to the 
public at an annual subscription fee of $2.50, while SIU offers its 
publication, Seafarers Log, to the public free of charge. The expulsion 
of Communism from seamen's unions removed a target for public censure 
and the possible association of a red tinge with a legitimate dispute 
over wages or working conditions. 
As further evidence of the intent to maintain good public 
relations, SIU accepted and endorsed at its San Francisco convention in 
March, 1957, the ethical practices codes of the AFL-CIO which are 
designed to keep the American labor movement clean and democratic.* 
* 35, P• 7 
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CH.API'ER V 
THE POSITION OF MANAGEMENT 
Management faces 3 critical problems in efforts to wrest a 
share of profits in its competitive field: (1) to increase productivity, 
(2) to satisfy worlcers, and (3) to promote industrial harmoey. Failure 
to meet aey one of these factors brings about an increase in costs and 
reduction in profits.* 
PRODUCTffiTY OF SEAMEN 
The inherent probleR4 Shoreside industries can p~ the high 
wages characteristic of American standards of living, yet cope 
effectively with foreign competition which enjoys the advantage of lower 
labor costs. The key to this apparent contradiction is American 
technological advances. The invention of new machines and their 
constant introduction into American mass production methods increase 
productivity at a rate which offsets the high American labor cost. The 
American product survives in the market because ita cost per unit 
provides for competitive pricing. 
Unfortunately, operations on board ship do not lend themselves 
readily to such application of technological superiority. Werle during 
the voyage is not production but service of various kinds to the ship 
and crew to enable her to arrive at destination as soon as possible. 
Standing watches, painting, cleaning decks, and serving meals are not 
* 13, P• i.x 
susceptible to mass production techniques. Hence the sh~p operator's 
dilemma consists of high labor costs comparable to shore jobs in order 
to induce workers to sea, but no technological recourse to increase 
productivity. The combination of high wages and low productivit,y has 
caused the maritime industry to become marginal in nature. When the 
world fleet is undertonnaged for a period of abnormal cargo movement, as 
for example severl years after World War II, Alnerican companies enjoy 
profitable operations because they can absorb their high labor costs. 
However, when cargo movements revert to normal and competitive 
conditions, the Alnerican operators feel the pinch of high maritime labor 
costs upon their profit margins.* 
Wages: v. profits. With a history of low productivity as a 
base, each wage increase makes the problem of competition with foreign-
flag ships more acute. Since 1938, wages of seamen have advanced from 
300 to 400 per cent while the earning ca~city of the average ship has 
increased only 25 per cent.** Table II shows the surging base wages, 
overtime, and fringe items in a comparison of the 1937 and 1952 levels. 
For emphasis it is worth repeating that overtime rose 1,350 per cent 
and fringes increased 10,660 per cent in this period. 
Even industries which have the abilit,y to attack the 
productivit,y problem have suffered profit-wise in the wage-price spirall 
since 1950. An anazysis of their complications emphasizes the static 
plight of the maritime industry's productivity which must cope with 
* 7 ,_ P• 21134 
- ;.::2, p. 
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TABLE XI 
MONTHLY WAGE COSTS FOR A TYPICAL UNITED STATES-FLAG 
C-2 TYPE VESSEL, 1937 AND 1952 
1931 1952 
Per cent Per cent 
Dollars of total Dollars of total 
Base wages 4,543 91.0 15,736 65.2 
Overtime 432 8.6 6,264 25.9 
Fringe Items 20 0.4 22152 8.9 
TOTALS 4,995 100.0 24,152 100.0 
Per cent 
increase 
over 1937 
246 
1,350 
102660 
384 
Source: u. s. Department of Commerce, Maritime Subsidy Policy, 
Washington: G. P. o., April, 1954. p. 52. 
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the same wage levels. Wages in the steel industr,r have increased 59 
per cent since 1950, while productivity has increased only 15 per cent. 
In the railroad industr,r, wages increased 40 per cent, productivity 
increased .30 per cerrt. In overall industr,r during this period, labor 
cost per unit of output advanced 22 per cerrt. From another viewpoirrt, 
wages as a portion of the national income increase from 64 per cent in 
1950 to 70 per cent in 1956. Profit margins were depressed from 3.4 per 
cent to 2.1 per cent.* 
Wages v. costs. Managemerrt believes that some costs of United 
States-flag vessels could be reduced to parity with those of foreign-
flag competitors. The reduction would require cooperation on the part 
of the maritime unions because it would entail revisions in the union 
contracts as, for example, to provide for feasible repairs at sea by the 
seaman. These agreements current~ spell out the duties of each job on 
board a vessel. The seaman is not required to perform duties outside 
the scope of his job except in cases of emergency. When he does perfonn 
other work, it is operational in nature - such as cleaning bilges, work 
on hatches, lashing cargo, cleaning fuel tanks - for 'lhich he receives 
overtime compensation. The flexibility of handling repairs at sea 
would eliminate port delays and would reduce costs according]y. The 
~stic Steamship Comp~ experienced an excellent illustration of this 
argument by management. This comp~ operates ships under both the 
United Statelf flag and foreign flag, and is in excellent position to 
make operational comparisons. On the maiden voyages of 2 ships under 
* 77, P• 97-98 
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both flags, the United States-flag ship returned to home port with the 
need for $15,000 in various minor repairs and adjustments. On the other 
hand, the crew of the foreign-flag ship had handled s:imilar repairs in 
like quantity during the voyage. Hence the latter vessel was not delayed 
in port to effect the repairs•* 
Super-carriers. One answer to the problem of increasing 
maritime productivity is the construction of larger, faster ships which 
can deliver more pounds of cargo and units of passengers per day's work 
of the seaman. A concomitant of this factor is the ability of 
management to supp:cy the ships with full cargo and passenger loads. 
Tanker operators have decided that size of a vessel is a 
salient determinant of productivity. Capacity may be enlarged without 
significant:cy increasing labor costs because a super-tanker requires no 
larger crew to navigate from port to port than a T-2 tanker of 16,000 
tons. For example, T-2 tanker operation costs $1.30 per barrel of 
petroleum products, whereas a 28,ooo-ton tanker operates at a cost of 
$1.20 per barrel.** As maritime unions negotiate higher wage levels, 
they change the actual costs: per barrel but the cost disparity between 
the tankers continues to exist. This productivity differential gave an 
impetus to the construction of super-tankers. From the workhorse T-2 
tanker of World War II emerged, in 1948, 26,ooo, 28,000, and 30,000-ton 
tankers. In the ear:cy 1950's, 45,ooo, 5o,ooo, 83,000 and 87,000-ton 
tankers sailed the trade routes. ~ 1957, the successful productivity 
* 93 
** 20, P• 2ll 
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record of the super-tankers induced management of tanker companies to 
build ships of 100,000 tons and larger. These ships surpass in size the 
largest of all types in the world incl~ding warships. An indication of 
the size and capacity of the super-tanker may be visualized by these 2 
comparisons: (1) the weight of the cargo alone of a 100,000-ton super-
tanker amounts to nearly twice the displacement of the world 1 s largest 
warship, the u.s.s. FORRESTJJL; and (2) while the T-2 tanker on ti1e Middle 
East run must use the Suez Canal for profitable operation, super-tankers 
can compete by detouring around Africa - a salient advantage during 
periods of crises.* 
Walter L. Green, president of the American Bureau of ShiPping, 
gave full credit to the foresight and vision of management for this 
advance in maritime productivitY•** However, this productivity 
advantage is not reserved for United States-flag ships. As foreign 
competitors build super-tankers, they will reduce their labor costs per 
unit to a still lower rate. 
"RUNAWAY" FLAGS 
Censure of management. Competition from "runaway" flags or 
"flags of convenience" has become an acute problem for traditional 
maritime countries and has attracted considerable hostility among labor 
unions in these countries. The growth of the "stateless" fleet, 
registered under the flags of Panama, Liberia, Honduras, and Costa Rica, 
* 76, P• 98-100 
** 66, P• 58M 
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has been substantial during 1948-1958. In 1958, dry-cargo ships over 
4,000 deadweight tons flying the flag of Liberia amounted to 21,9 per 
cent of the world's fleet, while all "flags of convenience" represented 
a significant 34.5 per cent.* 
Governments (except the United States), shipping companies, 
and labor unions of established seafaring nations have expressed concern 
over the loss of trade and jobs to vessels flying the "flags of 
coiiVenience." They have censured the competitive position of these 
non-national ships, attained b,y freedom from taxation, manning scales, 
safety requirements, and international shipping agreements.** Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Halvard Lange assured the Storting (Parliament) in 
June, 1958, that the British-Scandinavian joint cooperative committee 
Uniscan intends to take official action on this mutual problem•*** 
American maritime unions have blistered our government and 
American owners of "runaway" ships for the loss of over 16,000 jobs, 
caused b,y the transfer of more than 400 United States-flag ships to 
Liberian registry between 1953-1958.**** Labor criticized the 
representatives of the United States at the United Nations Conference on 
International Sea Law, held at Geneva in April, 1958, because the 
United States was the only major maritime nation to oppose the 
resolution for sanctions against the "runaways." The unions contend that 
our government's decision was influenced b,y the fact that 42 per cent of 
* 64, P• 575 
** 69, P• 135 
*** 65, Po 24 
**** 5o, p. 7 
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the 2h,ooo,ooo tons flying the "flags of convenience" are American owned 
or controlled. SIU pointed out the inconsisten~ of the American 
position: on one hand, legislating subsidies for the American Merchant 
Marine; on the other, supporting 11runawey-s" which in effect provides 
exemptions from the costs of taxes, maritime safety rules, and manning 
requirements•* NMU and SIU joined the 4-dey- international boycott 
against the "flags of convenience" on December 1-4, 1958, called by Orner 
Becu, General Secretary of the International Transport Workers Federation 
which claims 200 affiliates in 62 nations with 7,000,000 members. The 
powerful British Seamen's Union also supported the strike agair~t any 
ship which did not have a fair practice agreement with ITF. One 
requirement of the agreement is a minimum wage scale of $140 per month 
which is the equivalent of British wages plus fringes.** International 
unionists hailed the boycott of 200 ships in 17 countries as the first 
successful step in their action against "runawey-11 flags; Costa Rica 
amended its laws to cancel 128 foreign-owned ships in arrears on tax 
pey-ments and to abandon all convenience-flag registration after 
December 31, 1958.*** 
Cost differentials. To the "runawey-11 criticism management has 
offered no defense other than the valid economic answer of cost 
differentials between United States and foreign-flag vessel operations as 
listed in Table XII. In 1953, the wages of American seamen were 3 to 5 
times larger than the other nationalities included in the table. In 1957, 
* 39, P• 2 
** 55, P• 3 
*** 63, P• 1 
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TABLE III 
COMPARISON OF LABOR COSTS 
OF UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN-FLAG VESSELS 
1953 
WAGES SUBSISTENCE 
Monthly Differ- Ship-day Differ-
Countries Crew Costs ential Crew Costs ential 
Per cent Per cent 
United States 48 $29,426 48 $81.60 
Denmark 43 7,990 72.8 43 71.81 12.0 
France 47 10,274 65.1 47 60.50 13.6 
Italy 41 7,713 73.8 41 41.82 48.7 
Japan 56 6,273 78.7 56 30.24 62.9 
Netherlands 55 7,567 74.3 55 58.30 28.6 
Norway 43 7,1!:5 75.7 43 68.80 15.7 
United Kingdom: 
White crew 54 6,444 78.1 54 63.72 21.9 
Mixed crew 80 5,541 81.2 80 60.80 25.5 
Source: Division of Operating Costs, Office of Government Aid, 
Maritime Administration, as cited in Study of the Operations 
of the Maritime Administration and the Federal Maritime Board, 
Hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
84th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: G. P. 0., 1955. p. 281. 
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the ~stic Steamship Company experienced a monthly average of $16,000 
for base wages plus $5,000 for overtime in the operation of its United 
States-flag Libert,rs. For the same class vessel registered under 
foreign flag by the compaey, the total labor cost per month was about 
$6,ooo, just slightly more than the overtime alone payable to the 
American crew.* In a capitalistic society, which unions need to 
survive and thrive, there is no factor more basic than obtaining the 
cheapest labor in the open market. Foreign-flag operation does just 
that. 
Our government supports its position of defending "runaways" 
on the basis that the American owned or controlled "runaways" are 
readily available to the United States on call for a naval auxiliary 
fleet during national crises. The Maritime Administration, State 
Department, and the NaVY expressed this opinion in 1958•** 
Other competitive factors. A concomitant of high labor costs 
of United States-flag operation is the legal requirement to man vessels 
with citizens, No recourse to cheaper labor markets is available. In 
contrast, some vessels under the flag of Panama completely ignore that 
country's unenforced requirement that 10 per cent of the crew be 
Panamanian.*~~* To peg the costs still higher, the manning scales 
prescribed by the United States Coast Guard for the American Ymrchant 
Marine preclude navigation of the American vessel by a smaller crew as 
Dennark, France, Italy, and Norway are able to do successfully. Table 
* 93 
** 75, P• 1, 48 
*'** 59, P• 1 
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XII reveals that vessels of these countries operate with 1 to 7 fewer 
seamen than American vessels. United States-flag vessels are also 
subject to stringent but invaluable safety regulations. Less exacting 
requirements for foreign-flag vessels mean lower expenditures to equip 
crews and ships. 
Returning "runaways." True to their affinity to economic 
conditions, operators of "runaway" flags made application to the 
Maritime Administration in 1958 for the return of vessels to United 
States-flag operation. The international tramp charter market had 
dropped to a level of $3.00 to $3.85 a ton, while the rate for carrying 
United States Government cargo under the 1150-5011 law was as high as 
$17.48 a ton.* In addition, transfers to foreign flags had decimated 
the United States fleet to such an extent that our government was unable 
to find unemployed United States-flag freighters to carry the cargo at 
this peak cargo rate. The United States tramp fleet had dropped to the 
low of 70 ships.** Too many ships were competing for the foreign share 
of the 1150-5011 cargoes, lihile a portion of the American share of the 
cargoes went begging for carriers until it was assigned to foreign 
vessels, thereb,y reducing the American share below the legal 50 per cent 
provision. Small wonder that the transferred vessels made application 
to return. It is interesting to note that management of United States-
flag vessels objected to the return of these vessels and to the 
competition they offered. The A. H. Bull Steamship Compacy submitted a 
* 36, P• 3 
** 39, P• 16 
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protest to the Maritime Administration, stating that freighters in the 
moth-ball fleet should be utilized qy American companies on a charter 
basis rather than permit such fluctuation in and out of the American 
Merchant Marine•* The significance of the returning "runaways" is the 
complete adherence to a laissez-faire attitude in this matter by our 
government, allowing transfers in either direction despite objections 
by other governments, qy American and foreign management, and qy 
American and foreign maritime unions. For the operators involved, it is 
mere:cy- a condition of subscribing to the basic economic factors of the 
highest return per unit of labor cost to the extent nermitted by the 
~latory governments. 
Non-subsidized operators. Not all United States-flag vessels 
receive subsidies for labor cost differentials provided by the Merchant 
Marine Act of 19361 as amended. Prominent among non-subsidized operators 
are Alcoa Steamship Company, American Hawaiian Steamship Company, Arrow 
Steamship Company, A. H. Bull Steamship Company, Isbrandtsen Company, 
Isthmian Steamship Company, Matson Navigation Company, Pope and Talbot, 
South Atlantic Steamship Lines, Standard Fruit & Steamship Company, 
States Marine Corporation of Delaware, States Marine Corporation (N.Y.), 
Victory Carriers, and Waterman Steamship Company. These companies 
submitted reports of their financial condition to the Maritime 
Administration as the source of the data appearing in their section of 
Table XIII. Except for the years 1950 and 19511 the subsidized operators 
enjoyed a larger profit margin by year and on the average for the 1946-51 
* 391 P• 16 
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Year 
Total 
1946 19.5 
1947 27.1 
1948 14.7 
1949 14.8 
1950 10.1 
1951 15.7 
Average 
1946-51 16.5 
TABLE XIII 
COMPARISON OF RATE OF RETURN ON NET WORTH OF 
SUBSIDIZED CONTRACTORS AND NON-SL~SIDIZED 
OPERATORS, 1946-51 
(PER CENT)# 
Subsidized Companies 
Non-subsidized 
Companies 
Before Subsidy 
19.5 
25.8 
10.0 
7.0 
.6 
7.3 
10.5 
Net Subsidy 
1.3 
4.7 
7.8 
10.7 
8.4 
6.0 
9.2 
13.0 
3.3 
8.6 
10.8 
1e.3 
10.7 
# Percentage of operating earnings (exclusive of capital gains) to 
average of net worth at beginning and end of year. Earnings of 
subsidized lines are after estimated recapture accrual. Percentages are 
before taxes. 
Source: Reports to Maritime Administration as reported in Communication 
from the President of the United States Relative to Tax 
Deferment and Tax Exemption Benefits to the Maritime Industry, 
Together with a Report to the President on Government Assistance 
Necessary to Maintain a Merchant Marine Adequate to the Commercial 
and National Defense Requirements of the United States, Submitted 
by the Treasury Department Entitled "Scope and Effect of Tax 
Benefits Provided the Maritime Industry•" Washington, G. P. o., 
1953. P• 145. 
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period covered b.y the table. It should be noted that the A. H. Bull 
Steamship Compaey which protested the return of the "'runaways" is one of 
this lower marginal group. Here is an illustration of governmental 
inconsistenc,y: on one hand, legislating subsidy aid to the maritime 
industry; on the other, refusing to protect the operating earnings of 
the non-subsidized companies. 
LABOR RELATIONS 
Collective bargaining. "In no other major industry is the 
h= element so important as it is in the maritime industry where much 
of the necessary work is accomplished b.y the brain and brawn of those 
employed • • • It would be a mistake of the most serious nature if labor 
and management in the American Shipping industry were unable to settle 
a:rzy- differences amicably • • •" In two sentences, Frank J. Taylor, 
president of the American Marine Institute, ably summed up the 
sensitivity of collective bargaining in the maritime industry and the 
attendant responsibility of the leaders of both labor and management.* 
In the maritime industry, labor and manar·ement cannot be 
accused of amiable relationship for e~lary progress in collective 
bargaining. Deadlocks at the bargaining tables and strike-bound ships 
in ports continue to characterize the industry to the date of this 
thesis. A recent example was the failure of the International 
Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots to negotiate a contract and 
the strike in September, 1958, which tied up about 60 ships in east 
* 28, P• 130 
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coast ports, including the large passenger ships, SS UNITED STATES and 
55 AMERICA. The collective bargaining machinery bogged down to such an 
extent that it took skillful arbitration by George Heaey, president of 
AFL-CIO, to return the ships to sea. This is the first ti.me management 
requested a top labor leader to arbitrate a dead-lock, and his success 
may bring about a repetition for improved collective bargaining.* 
One factor for the breakdown of negotiations was the inability 
of the union to deal with the representative of the operators, the 
American Merchant Marine Institute. The union leaders by-passed the 
institute for direct dealing with the operators and negotiated 
individual contracts with 31 companies.** This successful collective 
bargaining with a portion of the companies indicates a need to analyze 
the discord between labor and the American Merchant Marine Institute. 
Frank L. Dwinnell lists 4 reasons for lack of completeharmo:ey 
in collective bargaining by maritime labor leaders and ship operators, 
as follows: (1) improperl;r written contracts, (2) chiseling on both 
sides after the contract has been negotiated, (3) failure by management 
to employ labor advisors, and (4) improper and insincere policy at the 
top on both sides.*** Management's selection of less efficient labor 
advisors as representatives at the bargaining table often produced a 
contract which management subsequentl;y" dishonored. Labor retaliated by 
similar noncompliance. A vicious spiral developed; collective bargaining 
sank to a new ebb. 
* 81, P• 21 
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Personnel problems. Productivity should be mentioned a.gain 
as the salient man-power problem in the maritime industr,r because this 
factor is an integral part of a vessel's labor cost. Its importance 
justifies repetition of the slow progress in this area. In the ear~ 
1940's, a ship was 40 per cent in port, 6o per cent at sea; 10 years 
later, the opposite was trueo* In addition, the progress which has 
been developed in ship speed has been frequent~ lost in port delay. 
The composition of shipboard personnel creates another man-
power problem. An ~sis of the duties and responsibilities of the 
work force reveals that there are 28 k~ shipboard positions on the 
average United StateS>-flag cargo ship. Seafaring jobs may be classified 
into 3 groups, as follows: (1) 20 per cent in professional and 
managerial positions, (2) 46 per cent in skilled and semi-skilled jobs, 
and (3) 34 per cent in unskilled jobs. Such high percentage of 
professional and managerial personnel can be found in o~ a few shore-
side industries.** Included in maQY responsibilities of the master 
and the mates is the full knowledge of navigation for efficient operation 
of the ship and safety of those on board. The engineers rrrust have 
degrees or certificates in diesel engineering. The radio operators must 
be capable of handling all radio operational problems which arise at 
sea. Skilled workers include firemen-watertenders, oilers, electricians, 
refrigerator engineers, and carpenters. Pursers handle the financial 
and clerical workloads. The stewards procure supplies. 
The technical composition of shipboard personnel brings about 
* 23, P• 35 
** 6o, Po 565 
the problem of man-power supply to fill these positions. In 1951, 
shortages existed in the key positions of radio operator, engineer, 
able seaman, oiler, and fireman-watertender. Just any willing worker 
cannot fill a vacancy because lime-third of seafaring jobs require from 
3 to 6 years of training. The maritime industry needs a stable reserve 
of man-power to the extent of 25 to 30 per cent of total employment.* 
llowever, the formation of a man-power reserve is hampered by the 
tendency of the seaman to seek employment ashore. The very nature of 
seafaring work with its voyage by voyage tenure provides little 
assurance for long-term employment. A survey of labor turnover for the 
period from July, 1945, to June, 1946, disclosed a total of 383,000 
terminations, about twice the average monthly employment for this 
period.* 
Management complains that union seniority rules discourage the 
entry of young, inexperienced men into the industry, diminishing the 
nucleus of a pool for the development of skilled, technical workers. 
For example, seniority rules for hiring on a SIU ship provide first 
preference for seamen who were associated with SIU before January, 1953, 
and who have shipped at least 90 days a year in 1953, 1954, and 1955. 
Second in preferential hiring come the seamen who were associated with 
SIU before January 1, 1954 and who have shipped at least 90 days a year 
in 1954, 1955, and 1956.** 
Another personnel problem is the rebellion against shipboard 
* 60, P• 566-67 
** 45, P• 2 
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semi-military discipline over both working hours and free time. Living, 
eating, and working close~ with other members of the crew call for 
regulated conduct to assure harmonious conditions in the confined area 
of the ship. Sometimes, over-indulgence in a wayport after several days 
at sea leads to trouble. Othertimes, rebellion against discipline 
itself disrupts harmoey. On shore, the boss discharges the rebellious 
worker, and that's that. At sea or in a foreign port, the solution is 
not so eas.y. The navigation laws of the United States are archaic in 
this respect. Section 701 of title 46, United States Code, provides 
penalties for such offenses as assaulting an officer, shore leave 
without permission, and refusal to obey a command at sea, but no legal 
recourse against cursing, insolence, or drinking liquor on board the 
vessel. The master may rid the vessel of a nuisance in a foreign port 
by appealing to an American Consul, but the compaey must pay the 
seaman's maintenance and repatriation expenses. In maey cases, the 
maritime unions will not tolerate an open breach of discipline and will 
penalize the member after a trial at the conclusion of the voyage. The 
voyage of the SS LEILANI from New York to San Francisco in March, 19S7, 
is an illustration of the shipboard discipline problem. Eight 
passengers filed a joint suit for $40,000 against the compaey, charging 
breach of contract because of insolent waiters, poor food, oil in the 
swimming pool, and a general breakdown of service. Conditions were so 
bad that 44 passengers disembarked at Balboa, Canal Zone, and continued 
by plane to San Francisco.* Union representatives arrived by plane and 
* 61, p. l 
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shipped as crewmembers at Balboa. No disturbances occurred during the 
remainder of the vqyage. Labor1s corrective action in these circumstances 
is commendable. However, the necessity for this recourse b,r management 
points out the peculiarity of such labor-induced costs to the maritime 
industry and the need for close cooperation b.1 maritime labor and 
management. 
Jurisdictional disputes. As the innocent b,rstander, management 
suffers the costs of tied-up vessels and the loss of revenue during 
jurisdictional disputes between maritime labor unions. The merger of 
AFL and CIO unions has neither united the SIU (AFL) and NMU (CIO) nor 
calmed their jurisdictional feud. SIU belongs to the AFL-CIO Maritime 
Trades Department, which is headed b,r the SIU leader, Paul Hall. NMU 
was a member for a short period after the merger, but withdrew during a 
flare-up of the persistent feud. 
Raid after raid takes place, each costly to management. In 
April, May, and June of 1957, the rival unions had a real sailors brawl, 
fighting for jurisdiction over the labor contract with the American Coal 
Shipping, Inc. Oddly enough, management in this case was John L. Lewis 
and his United Mine Workers together 'Iii th the coal operators. This 
brawl included such features as picket lines, exchanges of insults, 
court injunctions, and action b,r the National Labor Relations Board and 
courts. The camp~ had received approval from the Maritime 
Administration to charter 30 freighters, but the union feud held 
operation at a 6-ship level.* 
* 68, P• 54M 
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No area escapes this rivalry. The advent of the St. Lawrence 
Seaway opened a lucrative field to each union in June, 1958. The 
jurisdictional struggle shifted without difficulty into a hotter pace in 
this section of the country. Intensified organizing by each union 
continues despite the fact that neither exhibits an inclination to break 
with the parent AFL-CIO.* 
Two other examples of costs caused by jurisdictional disputes 
occurred in September, 1958. The union feud idled the SS VALIANT FREEDOM 
in Charleston until her owners gave up hopes for operational peace and 
took the alternative measure of chartering the vessel to the Martis 
Steamship Compaey which had a contract with SIU. The other case involved 
such a prolonged tie-up of the SS MAURICE GEORGE in Hoboken that the 
owners sold her to the World Carriers.** 
Management's suggestions for improved relations. Among the 
many steps ~ich management believes that labor should take to improve 
relations, the following are prominent: 
Management stresses that maritime unions should an~ze their 
wage demands to conform more close:cy to labor's own doctrine of a fair 
day's pay for a fair day's work. Labor leaders should cease striving 
for excessive benefits.*** The effect of this suggestion would 
constitute a control over the labor cost spiral produced by the play of 
one union's agreement against another. The measure of a fair da;y's pay 
should be in conformity with American standards Gllf living. The working 
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da;y" should consist of 8 hours; 40 hours should constitute the work week. 
Overtime pa;yment for Saturda;rs, S~s, and holidays is consistent with 
shore jobs, but nd.llions of Americans work at night without overtime. 
The payment of overtime for port work after 5:00 p.m. and before 8:00 
a.m. is not equitable. Maritime labor costs should have the same 
standards as those of shore transportation carriers - the competitors of 
coastwise and inter-coastal shipping. Railroads and trucking companies 
are not saddled with such overtime commitments. 
Another suggestion involves the adoption of a national policy 
for maritime labor.* The elind.nation of several contract negotiations 
with attendant strike possibilities at different times in the year is 
the aim of this suggestion. It would also bring an end to jurisdictional 
feuds which increase costs by picketing or by delays caused by crew 
shortages. 
Management believes that the seaman should extend himself more 
to improve productivity. For example, crewmembers should try to make all 
repairs possible during the vcyage to strive for fast tum-around in 
port.** A vessel earns no revenue while tied to a pier. It is the 
combination of income plus reduced idle time in port which provides the 
margin to pay the high cost of American maritime labor. 
Another approach to improve productivity is the suggestion that 
labor adopt a realistic attitude toward the manning requirements of a 
vessel.** For example, unions press for full complement of waiters 
* 21, P• 144-46 
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and other members of the stewards' department whether the ship's 
passenger load is 100 per cent, 50 per cent or 25 per cent of capacity. 
Obviously, a passenger load 75 per cent below capacity on any voyage 
should call for a reduction in those crew members who serve passengers. 
Otherwise, productivity suffers, and labor costs are undefensibly high. 
The 22•hour delay of the SS SANTA ROSA in September, 1958, illustrates 
this point. The crew became "sick"' at sailing time after exposure to the 
full load of 295 passengers. The "illnesses" sudd~ disappeared when 
the company agreed to sign on 6 additions to the vessel's full complement 
of 247. The vessel then sailed, carrying a ratio of almost one crew 
member to each passenger.* 
Management feels that common sense and good judgment should 
prevail for the mutual benefit of labor and management, especially when 
the possibility of reducing costs exists.** Mutual cooperation in this 
sense embraces the concept that both labor and management draw their 
wages and profits from the same margin of income above operating costs. 
Management believes that labor should be acutely aware of this residual 
source and be willing to take reasonable steps to protect it. An 
inherent right or a specific term, negotiated at the bargaining table and 
included in the agreement, should not be exercised sole]¥ for the sake of 
this right rather than its intent. As an example, the seamen on the 
United Fruit Company ships which call at Cristobal, Canal Zone, regular]¥ 
demand compliance by the operators of the union agreement for fresh milk. 
* 73, P• 158 
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The contract states that 100 quarts of milk shall be on board on sailing 
day when the ship sails from a United States port and foreign ports where 
milk, pasteurized in accordance with American standards on Consular 
advice, is readi~ available. No problem existed when a vessel could 
purchase stores from the Panama Canal Company. However, one of the terms 
of the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Panama 
in 1955 denied this source to vessels, requiring them to purchase from 
vendors in Panama. Although the Panamanian milk satisfies the standards 
by ~sis, some factor such as inadequate refrigeration during shipment 
across the Isthmus to the vessels causes 50 per cent of the milk to spoil 
before it can be consumed. The exercise of this admitted right reoccurs 
with each vessel's arrival as seamen demand contract compliance with full 
knowledge that 50 quarts of milk are regular~ thrown into the sea each 
trip.* The repetition of this case illustrates the principle of 
management's contention rather than a cost figure. 
Another example of the abuse of a seaman's right is the 
repetition of claims for illnesses and injury by an increasing percentage 
of seamen. A seaman has the right to receive wages until the end of his 
vessel's voyage if he becomes sick or injured and is hospitalized. If 
hospitalized in a foreign port, the company is also obligated to pay 
repatriation expenses. The abuse of this right has increased sharply 
during the past 7 years: from 47.5 per cent to 81.1 per cent of total 
maritime employment. In 1951, there were 40,934 cases of sickness and 
illness among 86,000 American seamen; in 1957, there were 47,490 claims 
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among 58,500 jobs. Such volume of claims is due to the activities of 
"repeaters" who use chronic symptoms for hospitalization at the first 
port of call of each voyage. Maey have more than 20 claims each. The 
Marine Index Bureau states that the cost burden has become critical and 
calls upon the maritime unions to work closely with management to combat 
this problem.* 
NEED FOR GOVERNMENT AID 
Impact of labor cost. An analysis of the plight of non-
subsidized operators as a result of mounting lebor costs is a good 
illustration of the need for government aid. The 8 per cent increase in 
base pay negotiated b,y maritime labor in 1958 (see Tables VII, VIII, and 
IX) followed an average increase of 6 per cent in 1956.>'* Added to the 
costs of base wages, the steamship companies experienced substantial 
increases in the management-borne costs of the comprehensive group of 
fringe benefits won at the bargaining table b,y labor from 1950 to 1956 
(see Chapter IV). Using the histor,r of NMU as an example, the cost of 
fringe benefits in 1950 was 25 cents per member per day. In 1956, this 
cost surged 300 per cent to $1.00 per member per day. The Masters, Mates 
and Pilots Union experienced a sharper increase during the same period: 
from 25 cents per man per day to $1.60, or 540 per cent.*** The SIU 
agreement of September, 1958, furnishes an evaluation of 1958-1959 costs· 
to management b,y its inclusion of such fringe benefits as (1) 6 per cent 
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increase in overtime rates, (2) 30 cents per man per day more for 
vacation payments, (3) 5 cents per man per day increase for SIU health 
and safety program, and (4) 5 cents per man per day for SIU feeding 
programs.* A reference to Table XI will reveal that the 1952 cost of all 
fringe items had increased 10,660 per cent over the 1937 level. During 
1948-1958, the cost of fringe benefits in manufacturing industries 
increased 200 per cent; in all industry and business it increased 264 per 
cent; in the maritime industry seamen's unions have pushed up the cost of 
fringe benefits 323 per cent.** 
It is not surprising that non-subsidized operators have eyed 
the operating-differential subsidy as one solution to their payroll 
pressures. In 1958, the non-subsidized Waterman Steamship Company 
submitted an application to the Federal Maritime Board for an operating 
subsidy on 4 essential trade routes. The comnanw had suspended its 
North Atlantic run because it could not compete with the subsidized 
companies and the foreign-flag competitors. Joining the Waterman 
Steamship Company at this time in application for operating-differential 
subsidies were 3 other major non-subsidized operators: Isbrandtsen 
Company, Isthmian Steamship Company, and States Marine Corporation. If 
their applications are approved, this major defection will decimate the 
ranks of liner companies, leaving operators of tramps and tankers as the 
major survivors of the non-subsidized group. 
Palmer Hoyt, publisher of the Denver Post, summed up this 
* 42, P• 3 
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situation, stating, '~erating subsidies are necessary because American 
seamen are the best paid, best fed, and best quartered in the world."* 
Block obsolescence. Another contributing factor to the need 
for government aid is the adverse condition of block obsolescence which 
threatens the American Merchant Marine. Although not a labor cost per 
se, it is related to the extent that a fleet of Predominant~ old, slow 
ships cannot compete as effectivelY as modern, fast vessels with larger 
capacities. Excess days on a voyage increase total labor costs as well 
as other operating costs. 
One of the aims of our government in its program of subsidizing 
the maritime industry is the maintenance of a fleet of modern vessels. 
To be eligible for subsidies, operators must depreciate their vessels 
and continuallY replace them on a 20-year cycle. The 1960's loomed as 
the culmination of the block obsolescence problem: the subsidy deadline 
for about 80 per cent of the merchant fleet.** Recognizing that such 
group replacement imposes a severe hardship upon the industry, the 
Federal Maritime Board formulated an extension of ship replacements, 
shown in Table XIV. To soften the financial blow for replacing ships, 
the Board deferred the effective dates from 3 to 10 years. While this 
action provides temporary relief for the capital program of replacing the 
ships listed in the table, the obsolescence factor remains to stimulate 
high labor costs. 
Consummation of government policy. The Merchant Marine Act of 
* 18, P• 24 
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TABLE XIV 
SHIP REPLACEMENT EXTENSIONS 
BY FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD 
Name of operator Vessel 
20 years 
of age 
Scheduled 
replace-
ment 
Grace Line Inc • • • • • • • • • Santa Ana • • • • • 1060 1963 
Santa Teresa • • • • 1960 1963 
Santa Juana, • • • • 1962 1968 
Santa Adela. • • • • 1962 1968 
Santa Cruz • • • • • 1962 1969 
Santa Flavia • • • • 1963 1968 
Santa Eliana • • • • 1964 1968 
Santa Leonor • , • • 1964 1968 
Santa Mercedes , • • 1964 1968 
Santa Fe • , , , , • 1964 1969 
Santa Anita. • • , • 1964 1969 
Santa Paula, • • • • 1952 1958 
Santa Rosa • • • • • 1952 1959 
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc •• , Argentina, ••••• 1949 1958 
Brazil • • • • • • • 1948 1958 
American President Lines, Ltd •• President Harrison • 1963 1966 
President Johnson • 1963 1966 
President Van Buren, 1963 1966 
President McKinley • 1966 1966 
President Monroe • • 1960 1963 
President Polk , • • 1961 1963 
President Hoover • • 1959 1961 
Source: u. s. Department of Commerce, Federal Maritime Board and 
Maritime Administration, Annual Report of the Federal Maritime 
Board and Maritime Administration, 1957. Washington, D. c., 
G. P. O,, 1957. P• 10, 
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1936, as amended, states, "It is necessary for the national defense and 
development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States 
shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry • • • a substantial 
portion of the waterborne export and import commerce of the United 
States • • 
·" 
An analysis' of Table XV will disclose that United States-flag 
vessels have carried diminishing percentages of our imports, exports, 
and total water-borne foreign trade over the 10-year span of the table. 
The total decline in each category has been sharp and substantial: in 
imports, from 65.8 to 26.5 per cent; in exports, from 51.3 to 19.7 per 
cent; and in total water-borne foreign commerce, from 60.4 to 23.5 per 
cent. Obviously this part of the policy contained in the Act has not 
been consummated. 
Since subsidized companies have received their full operating-
differential subsidies to offset the effect of foreign, low-cost 
maritime labor, the high labor cost of these United States-flag ships 
cannot be accused of reducing profits. This is particulal!'l;y true when 
the American operators belong to shipping conferences Wl.ich fix cargo 
rates and thereby assure revenue ratios to wage costs on a parity with 
foreign-flag competitors. 
Without the wage-cost equalizer, the noR-subsidized companies 
cannot compete in the open market for cargoes even under the umbrella of 
shipping conferences. This is clearly evident in the following foreign 
commerce statistics of 1955 =* 
* 84, P• 13 
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TABLE TV 
WATER-BORNE FOREIGN TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES 
1946-1955 
(IN MILLIONS OF TONS OF 2,240 LBS.) 
IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
Per cent Per cent Per cent 
u.s. u.s. u.s. u.s. u.s. u.s. 
Year Total flag flag Total flag flag Total flag flag 
1946# 43.9 28.9 65.8 77.7 44.5 57.3 121.6 73.h 60.h 
1947# 52.9 33.6 63.5 lll.O 54.5 49.1 163.9 88.1 53.8 
1948# 60.2 36.2 60.1 78.8 30.8 39.1 139.0 67.5 48.6 
1949# 69.1 36.9 53.4 64.2 23.3 36.3 133.3 60.2 45.2 
1950# 86.3 37.7 43.7 56.0 18.2 32.5 142.3 55.9 39.3 
1951# 90.2 38.2 42.4 103.0 38.7 37.6 193.2 76.9 39.8 
1952# 95.9 37.2 38.8 92.0 27.2 29.6 187.9 64.h 34.3 
1953# 106.3 34.4 32.4 71.9 17.4 24.1 177.9 51.7 29.1 
1954 107.5 32.3 30.0 69.3 16.3 23.5 176.8 48.6 27.5 
1955 126.0 33.4 26.5 100 19.7 19.7 226.0 53.1 23.5 
# Excludes U. s. ~ and Navy cargo. Includes Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto 
Rico. Beginning in July 1950, also excludes commodities classified for 
security reasons as "special category" and foreign aid shipments on 
Department of Defense controlled vessels. Excludes merchandise in transit. 
Source: For 1946-50, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign 
Commerce and Navigation of the United States, annual report, and 
records as cited in Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1952 (Washington: 
G. P. o., 1952), Table 649, p. 535; for 1951, Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign Trade Division, Sununary 
Report FT 973 (Washington: M~ 19, 1953); for 1952, u. s. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, ''Water-Borne 
Foreign Trade Statistics, "Summary Report FT 985 (Washington: 
June 15, 1954), P• 9. For 1953-54, Same, "United States Water-
Borne Foreign Trade," Summary Report FT 985 (Washington: 
July 24, 1955,) p. 10. For 1955, p. 10. For 1955, Same, ''Water-
Borne Foreign.Trade Statistics," ••• (monthly issues). The 1955 
figures are subject to revision. 
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1. Preferential cargo subject to the 50 per cent United 
States-flag provision of Public Law 664, 83d Congress, amount to about 
20 per cent of the export cargo carried by subsidized vessels. 
2. In contrast, this cargo supplied about 80 per cent of the 
export cargo carried by the non-subsidized tramps and tankers. 
3. Total preferential cargo carried by United States-flag 
vessels represented only 6 per cent of total water-borne foreign 
commerce. 
4. About 94 per cent of our water-borne commerce is available 
on the open market to vessels of all flags on a competitive basis. 
It is not surprising that the non-subsidized tramps and tankers 
resort to the non-competitive market of preferential cargoes to pay their 
high labor costs. Nor is it illogical to expect any result except a 
decline by United States-flag vessels in the movement of our water-borne 
commerce. 
If our government intends to realize its policy of carrying a 
substantial portion of our export and import commerce in vessels of the 
United States, further preferential treatment is obviously necessary. 
Management points to the fact that the American public is one of the 
world's largest consumers, a factor which could influence the selection 
of carriers for our imports at least.* 
* 27, P• 143 
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CHAPTER. VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLCSIONS 
To strive for clarity in reviewing the material covered by the 
preceding chapters, the summary follows the order of its presentation 
rather than attempting to weight the items in the order of their 
importance to the maritime industry. 
SUMMARY 
The American seaman. The high cost of labor in the maritime 
industry goes to make the American seaman the best paid, the best fed, 
and the best quartered among all maritime nations. His hours of work, 
the work week, holidays, and vacations measure up to those of the 
American citizen ashore. Other fringe benefits, such as subsistence and 
the comprehensive list of welfare items exceed most shoreside jobs. 
The ramifications of life at sea, however, do much to offset 
the favorable comparisons. To provide harmony while working, eating, and 
living in close relationship with the other crew members, both working 
hours and free time are subject to semi-militaristic discipline. Perhaps 
the salient disadvantage is separation from his family: the more constant 
his earning power, the more permanent his absence from home. He has 
little opportunity to share the lives of his children. 
The American seaman believes that the hiring hall is necessary 
for a fair distribution of jobs in the characteristically casual 
employment of the maritime industry. No longer is it necessary to spend 
long hours on the piers personally soliciting employment or to buy a job 
by bribing a company official. Consequently, he fully supports his 
union in efforts to recover full control of the hiring hall ~y 
modification of the section of the Taft-Hartley Act which frowns upon 
the closed shop and discrimination in hiring. American seamen are 100 
per cent unionized. 
Government policy, By legislating the Merchant Marine Act of 
1936, the United States announced its policy of subsidizing the 
development and maintenance of a merchant marine consisting of modern 
ships capable of (l) carrying the domestic water-borne commerce, (2) 
carrying a substantial portion of the foreign water-borne commerce, and 
(3) serving as a supplement to the navy in times of war. Included in 
this government aid is an operatiDg-differential subsidy computed to pay 
qualified operators on 31 essential trade routes the difference between 
their labor costs and those of their foreign-flag competitors. 
The United States also extends aid to the maritime industry by 
cabotage monopoly, authorization of shipping conferences, and preferential 
cargoes. 
The total subsidy paid to the maritime industry in 1953 
amounted to only 3 per cent of national subsidy to all industries. On 
this basis the cost of the operating-differential subsidy, ohich is only 
a portion of the 3 per cent, is not an excessive liability of the 
national budget. 
Labor's viewpoints. Maritime labor leaders aim for wages on a 
par with similar jobs ashore, but they have pushed the management-borne 
costs of fringe benefits substantially higher than other industries. 
They are 'i!!ll aware that the dis advantages associated with life at sea 
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Will abruptly decimate the ranks of seamen and the memberships of 
maritime unions if the pay and working conditions of the American seaman 
are not sufficiently attractive to lure him away from shore jobs. 
Maritime unions advocate the operating-differential subsidies 
which help pay the admittedly high labor cost of the maritime industry. 
Since our government has announced a national need for a merchant marine, 
financial aid is necessary to pay differentials W1 ich reflect American 
and foreign standards of living. In its support of a large merchant 
fleet, labor criticizes the n·runaway11· flags because they represent loss 
of jobs and increased foreign-flag competiti.on. On the return of 
"runaways" to United States-flag operation in 1958, the unions are silent 
because of the resulting job increases despite the fact that non-
subsidized companies experience accelerated competition for preference 
cargoes. 
Maritime labor presses for more government aid to enlarge the 
maritime industry and to provide more jobs because subsidies are about 
3 per cent of the country's total subsidy cost to all industries. The 
government recovers in personal and corporate taxes the annual average 
cost of the subsidies, $29,000,000, keeping current a merchant fleet 
which would cost $497,000,000 to build. 
Cooperation with management for efficient and economical 
operation is an expressed desire of maritime labor. Union constitutions 
include sections dealing with trials and penalties for offenses 'ibich add 
or increase costs. Other forms of cooperation have included tempering 
bargaining demands during a recession and a $500,000 loan to aid a hard-
pressed operator. 
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Labor has announced its intention to pursue its objective for 
increased welfare benefits, formal maritime training schools, and good 
relations with management and the public, 
Management's position. The salient problem in the maritime 
industry is low productivity. The capacity and speed of ships have been 
increased, but t.hese improvements fall far short of the productive 
progress enjoyed by other industries. The technique of mass production, 
which allows the American product to compete on the open market, cannot 
be applied readily to the navigation of a vessel. Hence in the wage-
price spiral, costs rise and profits shrink in the marit~£ industry, 
In efforts to improve the profit picture, management has 
resorted to the acquisition of cheap labor on the open market by 
operating under the "flags of convenience,• The growth of the fleets 
under the flags of Pana~, Honduras, Liberia, and Costa Rica has been so 
alarming to the traditional maritine countries that the International 
Transport Workers Federation voted for a world-wide boycott of these 
ships on December 1-4, 1958. The intent is to narrow the competitive 
advantage of the "flags of convenience" by forcing them to increase wages 
of their seamen to the British level of $140 per month, 
All "runaway" flags have not enjoyed profitable operation. 
¥4U1y have returned to the United States flag to be eligible for 
preferential cargoes. Non-subsidized operators have criticized the 
return of these ships because they are unable to compete with subsidized 
companies and competitors, The return of the "runaways" spreads the 
preferential cargoes too thin. 
Management feels that labor does not live up to its announced 
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polirr.y of good relations. Unions still employ the weapon of labor 
strikes, shipboard discipline problems lower productivity, and 
jurisdictional disputes continue to increase costa despite the AFL-CIO 
merger. The improvement in labor relations will occur, management 
contends, when labor conforms to its own principle of a fair day's work 
for a fair day's p~, when labor bargains on a national policy to 
preclude sporadic strikes, when labor helps reduce costly idle time in 
port, and when labor ceases to incur costs unnecessarily by abuse of 
rights. 
Management acknowledges the need for operating-differential 
subsidies to pay the highest labor cost of all maritime nations. With 
government aid equalizing operating costs and with shipping conferences 
fixing rates, the subsidized operator can compete effectively with 
foreign-flag ships. The non-subsidized operator, however, cannot cope 
with his high labor costs despite the economic shelter of preferential 
cargoes. Both subsidized and non-subsidized operators face the common 
disadvantage of block obsolescence in the American Merchant Marine. 
United States-flag vessels are becoming more costly to operate and 
req~ire replacement as a group rather than the desirable single, well 
spaced replacement. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Non-subsidized operators. The material developed in Chapter V 
reveals clearly that non-subsidized companies need help to meet their 
payrolls. The umbrella of preferential cargoes does not provide the 
shelter e~valent to the operating-differential subsidy. As a result, 
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the maritime policy of our government suffers: Each year United States-
flag ships carry a smaller portion of our export and import cargoes. 
Since our navigation laws preclude the operators' obtaining the cheapest 
labor on the open market by the citizen-manning requirement, the makers 
of these laws and our maritime policy are obligated to legislate further 
relief. 
Following this line of thought, our government should deal 
pragmatically with preferential cargoes. Why not consider them in the 
light of providing dual relief: to the needy American maritime industry, 
as well as to the needy foreign recipient? Why not consider them as 
part of our overall national subsidy and increase the share for United 
States-flag ships beyond the SO per cent level up to as much as 100 per 
cent if necessary? Certainly there is roam for increasing the American 
share of preferential cargoes when about 94 per cent of our water-borne 
commerce is available on the open market to vessels of all nations. 
What are the implications of this step? The argument of 
retaliation by other countries does not apply because the United States 
foots the bill for relief shipments. lf other countries desire to extend 
relief to various needy areas of the world, they also should have the 
prerogative of deciding whom they wish to pay for all facets of the 
transaction, including transportation of the relief goods. 
Preferential cargoes should be divorced completely from a 
foreign trade concept. The former is charity with the inherent right of 
the donor to make all decisions; the latter is commerce with the 
ramifications of competition and retaliation. For its imports and 
exports, our government should exert no controls, allowing free play of 
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the influences of traders in the foreign conmerce market. 
A more effective implementation of preferential cargoes would 
result in increasing the subsidy to the maritime industry. This addition 
should not promote serious argument because the maritime industry 
receives only about 3 per cent of the overall national subsidy. 
"Runaways." A corollary of aid to the non-subsidized operators 
is the problem of the "runaways."' Our government has refused to adopt 
any restrictive action oli the "flags of convenience" even to the extent 
of being the sole nation member of the International Labor Organzation 
of the United Nations to oppose such restrictions. 
This policy is unrealistic and leaves the government open to 
criticism of protecting the American financial interests in the 
"runaways."' Permitting fluctuations in and out of the American Merchant 
Marine allows an operator to skim the cream off the milk of international 
coiiJllerce to the detriment of the operators who pay taxes to the 
traditional maritime countries. This unrestricted movement in and out of 
our merchant fleet disrupts the planning and budgets of the operators 
under all flags. Operation under the "flags of conven:i.ence" constitutes 
a 100 per cent subsidy by the taxation relief and lower standards for 
labor costs. Under these circumstances, the "runaways" should not be 
allowed to return to the American flag. The non-p~ent of taxes removes 
the right to return. But they should be allowed to go under foreign 
registry; we should not have a captive fleet. Closing the door for 
return will reduce the pace of leav:!_ng as the consequences are pondered. 
As economic conditions induce replacement of those 'itlich do 
leave by new ships, this change will give effect to the government 
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policy of modernizing the fleet. While labor will lose the jobs on 
ships that do runaway, the relacements ~ offset the loss. This 
policy will also provide a more consistent level of jobs in the maritime 
industry. 
As a supplement to this policy, the United States should join 
the other maritime nations in subscribing to the minimum labor standards 
advocated by ILO for ships of all flags. 
The argument that these American-owned, foreign-flag ships 
could be called into service during a national emergency does not hold. 
They would be compelled to adher to the dictates of the country whose 
flag they fly. For example, during World War II Arnulfo Arias, former 
president of Panama, refused to go along with the United States in arming 
his merchant fleet. Hence their war-time value was impaired. 
Finally, legislators should squarely face the fact that 
American citizens with their high standards of living are here to stay on 
American ships. Any program to internationalize the American fleet as an 
alternative to "runaways" for cheap labor will make little progress 
because of the strength of maritime labor unions. Such thoughts are 
unrealistic in view of 100 per cent unionized labor in the maritime 
industry and the strength of labor federations in our country. 
Fringe benefits. While basic wages have increased substantially 
in the maritime industry during 1948-1958, comparisons with si~ar jobs 
ashore disclose a parity. This is not true in the case of fringe 
benefits. Unions have been excessive in their demands for increased 
fringes, driving up their costs 323 per cent in the maritime industry 
during 1948-1958 compared to 200 per cent in manufacturir~ and 264 per 
cent in all industry and business. 
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The high cost of fringe benefits and labor's announced goal of 
increased benefits defeat the argument that maritime labor unions are 
merely trying to keep abreast of shoreside rates. Accordingly, if labor 
is sincere in its declaration of labor-management cooperation, fringe 
benefits should be reduced until their costs subside to the level of 
comparable shoreside jobs, This drop in costs should provide a certain 
measure of relief for the non-subsidized operators. It follows that the 
government should also realize a saVings from reductions in the 
operating-differential subsidies, 
Abuse of rights. If labor insists upon its rights rather than 
its obligations, it negates at the same time its declaration for 
constructive cooperation with management, Unions should realize that 
they have an equal stake with management in their uneconomic industry. 
No real solution will be possible until labor and management recognize 
common goals, In the cost-provoking abuse of rights, labor should 
substitute a long-run attitude for its short-run viewpoint, It should 
relinguish present rights to petty or unethical matters for the prospects 
of larger returns or a healthier industry in the ~1ture, To a 
distressing degree, the uneconomic maritime industry needs a discerning 
labor component which can weigh the economic impact of all factors of its 
egalitarian concept. 
Jurisdictional strikes, While interunion feuding is not 
peculiar to maritime labor, the maritime industry sails along a more 
precarious economic course than its shoreside counterpart to absorb the 
costs incurred by jurisdictional troubles. Theses costs illustrate 
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management's claim that unions are concerned only with union growth and 
not the good of the industry. Ample time has passed since the merger of 
AFL and CIO unions on December 5, 1955 to come up with a harmony formula. 
to prevent costs incurred by one union's attempt to "muscle in"' on 
another's jurisdiction. Of all costs associated with labor, these rate 
the least justification because of the 1955 labor merger. F~ther than 
saddle management with such costs, maritime unions should resort to 
legal remedies such as those contained in Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley 
law, designed to eliminate jurisdi::tior.al strikes. This section sets 
forth the rights of a union to sue another for raiding. A- jurisdictional 
strike indicates that one union has infringed upon the rights of another. 
Let the guilty union pay the penalty, not management. 
Communication by management. The final conclusion deals with 
the need for management to tell its story better. Without being 
pollyannish, management can do much to foster employee support for lower 
labor costs and improved productivity by narrowing the gulf of 
misunderstanding between the two. H0w many seamen understand the 
relationship of profits to jobs and job security? How many seamen 
understand the relationship of wage increases to productivity in the 
maritime indus try? 
There is no basic conflict of interest between maritime labor 
and management. The sporadic tussles at the bargaining table and labor's 
occasional exercise of its economic muscle along the waterfront are 
conflicts which grow out of misunderstanding. 
For example, if management developes a program of better 
coromxnication, it could demonstrate its obligation to obtain full cargo 
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n~~~~~ Jn 11lr ~1 t' uu f.lr"'bf ra..m..,.·r. 
"The Olll' plantt we ~hould n Jllort·." 
and passenger loads as its part of the productivity problem. In turn, 
this communication would relate the seaman to his job and the problem, 
le~.ding to reduction of excessive man-power requirements for the ur.d~r­
capacity voyages described in Chapter V. 
Better communication 1rill induce the seru"lan to identify himself 
with the ship or company, to accept the logic of efficiency, and to 
unite in constructive cooperation. Industry-wide bargaining should 
follow to eliminate sporadic negotiations during the year. With these 
developments, the problems described in this thesis will have little 
tenure against the combined attack of labor and ~anagement. 
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